502us2$26D 01-22-99 08:32:58 PAGES OPINPGT 380 RUFO v. INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL Opinion of the Court right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be.” 286 U. S., at 114–115. Our decisions since Swift reinforce the conclusion that the “grievous wrong” language of Swift was not intended to take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all efforts to modify consent decrees. Railway Employes emphasized the need for flexibility in administering consent decrees, stating: “There is . . . no dispute but that a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen.” 364 U. S., at 647. The same theme was repeated in our decision last Term in Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 246–248 (1991), in which we rejected the rigid use of the Swift “grievous wrong” language as a barrier to a motion to dissolve a desegregation decree. There is thus little basis for concluding that Rule 60(b) misread the Swift opinion and intended that modifications of consent decrees in all cases were to be governed by the standard actually applied in Swift. That Rule, in providing that, on such terms as are just, a party may be relieved from a final judgment or decree where it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application, permits a less stringent, more flexible standard. The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), has made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the more important. Because such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased. See, e. g., Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization v. Shapp, 602 F. 2d 1114, 1119– 1121 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1026 (1980), in which modification of a consent decree was allowed in light of