form of soft law status as a result of Committee’s use of its tests in subsequent documents.52 Alternatively, it might be argued that while the Letter and indeed General Comments are not authoritative as a result of their form, the particular institutional position of the CESCR may lend legal weight to the statements. While in general international law is highly Statecentric,53 since leaving the interpretation of human rights treaties solely in the hands of States would likely result in overly restrictive interpretations 54 it is possible to recognise treaty bodies as acting ‘in lieu’ of States in certain respects.55 This would validate the CESCR’s primary responsibility for the interpretation of the Covenant and might allow such interpretative practice to count as ‘subsequent practice’ under the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation, thus giving the statements of the Committee some legal significance.56 In any case, even if the Letter lacks soft law status, adjudicative bodies would likely take it seriously as an interpretation of the ICESCR obligations.57 In practice, however, the Letter has significance beyond its legal influence. By providing (at the very least) a point of reference or a form of words that can be reproduced in the CESCR’s Concluding Observations on State reports, the Letter has a degree of rhetorical power. Of the 54 States that have been examined since the release of the Letter, ten have been reminded of it or have had its wording reproduced in their Concluding Observations.58 In the international sphere of governance such use of rhetoric has been effectively employed for the purposes of compulsion59 and such potential influence – whether legal or rhetorical – means the content of the CESCR’s Letter should be taken seriously and subjected to critical attention. There are two primary indicators of the new ‘accommodation’ direction; firstly, the fact that any change in approach at all took place in the context of the financial and economic crises and secondly, the substance and character of the changes. It is common for crisis situations and the rhetoric surrounding them to be used to ground claims for greater deference to those exercising power. 60 Implicitly, this is what has occurred in the CESCR’s Letter to States. The letter formed the Committee’s primary response to the financial and economic, and the CESCR used it to make substantial alterations to the doctrine of non-retrogression. In addition, the CESCR relies on rhetorical devices to show deference to States and to inflate the importance of (neo-liberal) market-based idea(l)s. For example, there is a flat acceptance that ‘a lack of growth, impede[s] the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’, and a reminder that States should ‘avoid at all times’ denials of socio-economic rights.61 This is weak phrasing that might be indicative of a cautious approach by the CESCR. If there was anything in the uncertainty of a crisis that the CESCR could state with confidence it was that States ‘should not’ violate socio-economic rights. 52 Ibid, 51. Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (4th ed, OUP Oxford 2014) 294-5. 54 Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905, 919. 53 55 Ibid. A function also with some grounding in the ICESCR itself; ICESCR (n 4) article 21. International Law Association, ‘International Human Rights and Practice: Final Report on the Impact of the Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) para 22; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), article 31(3)b. 56 57 Crystallization into customary international law is also possible. See generally; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 201. In the CESCR’s Concluding Observations on Ireland (E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, para 11), Slovenia (E/C.12/SVN/CO/2, para 8), Romania (E/C.12/ROU/CO3-5, para 15), Czech Republic (E/C.12/CZE/CO/2, para 14), Ukraine (E/C.12/UKR/CO/6, para 5), Japan (E/C.12/JPN/CO/3, para 9), New Zealand (E/C.12/NZL/CO/3, para 17), Iceland (E/C.12/ISL/CO/4, para 6), Bulgaria (E/C.12/BGR/CO/4-5, para 11), and Spain (E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, para 8). See further; Nolan (n 48), 51-52. 58 59 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2004) 15. 60 Scheuerman (n 9) 1871. 61 7 Letter to States (n 1, Annex I), 5, 3 (emphasis added).