Chapter 5 | Page 211 behave as if the effect is absent.109 While fungibility does not necessarily negatively affect the overall benefit of the additional funds flow to the economy,110 it may contribute to a weakening in the State’s allocative efficiency in relation to available resources. 5.3.2.4 International aid flow, corruption and rent-seeking behaviour The ‘side-effects’ of the flow of international aid include associated corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. Rent-seeking behaviour is related to aid windfalls and an associated increase in corruption, particularly in countries with competing social groups111 and fewer institutional safeguards. There is also the perception that the expectation of aid increases rent-seeking behaviour and decreases public spending. Aid flow influences the political process in the recipient country, which can have significant impact on the overall promotion and protection of human rights. As such, political stability has a positive impact on the effectiveness of aid.112 The ability of international assistance to improve quality of life is often associated with other factors such as democracy and good governance.113 Rent-seeking behaviour can be reduced through binding policy commitments between donors and recipients.114 The literature on aid effectiveness presents contrasting views on the connection between aid and corruption in recipient States. Simplice Asongu presents evidence from 52 African countries which shows the existence of a 109 Dominique Van de Walle and Ren Mu, 'Fungibility and the Flypaper Effect of Project Aid: Micro-Evidence for Vietnam' (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4133, The World Bank). 110 Rahman, above n 28; Stefan Leiderer, 'Fungibility and the Choice of Aid Modalities: The Red Herring Revisited' (Working Paper No. 2012/68, United Nations University), <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Fungibility%20and%20the%20Choice %20of%20Aid%20Modalities.pdf>. 111 Jakob Svensson, 'Foreign aid and rent-seeking' (2000) 51 Journal of International Economics 437–461, 455. 112 Ibid., 456-457. 113 Stephen Kosack, Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the Quality of Life' (2003) 31(1) World Development 1–22. 114 Svensson, above n 111.