BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND JUDGMENT 41 1. The applicable rule 141. The parties did not, however, agree on whether that interference amounted to a deprivation of property (first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) or a control of the use of property (second paragraph). The Court reiterates that, in guaranteeing the right of property, this Article comprises “three distinct rules”: the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see AGOSI, cited above, p. 17, § 48). 142. The Court considers that the sanctions regime amounted to a control of the use of property considered to benefit the former FRY and that the impugned detention of the aircraft was a measure to enforce that regime. While the applicant company lost the benefit of approximately three years of a four-year lease, that loss formed a constituent element of the abovementioned control on the use of property. It is therefore the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which is applicable in the present case (see AGOSI, cited above, pp. 17-18, §§ 50-51, and Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B, pp. 47-48, § 59), the “general principles of international law” within the particular meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (and relied on by the applicant company) not therefore requiring separate examination (see Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH, pp. 51-53, §§ 66-74). 2. The legal basis for the impugned interference 143. The parties strongly disagreed as to whether the impoundment was at all times based on legal obligations on the Irish State flowing from Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93. For the purposes of its examination of this question, the Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law even when that law refers to international law or agreements. Equally, the Community's judicial organs are better placed to interpret and apply Community law. In each instance, the Court's role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Waite and