44 BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND JUDGMENT expressly excluded from its ambit aircraft already lawfully impounded, and neither the ECJ nor the Supreme Court referred to this point in their respective ruling (of July 1996) and judgment (of November 1996). 148. For these reasons, the Court finds that the impugned interference was not the result of an exercise of discretion by the Irish authorities, either under Community or Irish law, but rather amounted to compliance by the Irish State with its legal obligations flowing from Community law and, in particular, Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93. 3. Whether the impoundment was justified (a) The general approach to be adopted 149. Since the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is to be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the opening sentence of that Article, there must exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised: the Court must determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest in this respect and the interest of the individual company concerned. In so determining, the Court recognises that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the means to be employed and to the question of whether the consequences are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the objective pursued (see AGOSI, cited above, p. 18, § 52). 150. The Court considers it evident from its finding in paragraphs 145 to 148 above that the general interest pursued by the impugned measure was compliance with legal obligations flowing from the Irish State's membership of the European Community. It is, moreover, a legitimate interest of considerable weight. The Convention has to be interpreted in the light of any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 55, ECHR 2001-XI), which principles include that of pacta sunt servanda. The Court has also long recognised the growing importance of international cooperation and of the consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations (see Waite and Kennedy, §§ 63 and 72, and AlAdsani, § 54, both cited above; see also Article 234 (now Article 307) of the EC Treaty). Such considerations are critical for a supranational organisation such as the European Community1. This Court has accordingly accepted that compliance with Community law by a Contracting Party constitutes a legitimate general-interest objective within the meaning of Article 1 of 1. See Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585.