A/HRC/10/5 page 10 17. Second, members’ commitments under the FAC should be expressed in ways other than in wheat equivalents. One possibility is to define these commitments as a percentage of assessed needs whereby each State commits itself, in accordance with its ability,30 to cover a predefined percentage of the needs identified over a certain period, preferably on a multiannual basis. This change would introduce an element of uncertainty in the commitments of donor countries. This uncertainty is already present in the current system, since commitments expressed in tonnage will vary, as to their budgetary implications, following the variation of the prices of commodities in international markets. Expressing commitments as a percentage of assessed needs would share the risk equally across all parties to the FAC, and would avoid the dangers associated with food aid being driven by the commercial or geopolitical interests of donor States. In addition, States may insure themselves against this risk, by resorting to reinsurance mechanisms. Finally, this way of expressing commitments under the FAC would avoid the problem of counter-cyclical aid, which plagues the current system. 18. Another possible mode of expressing commitments could be for FAC members to commit to meeting the costs of insurance schemes, with a view to enhancing the predictability of aid and putting an end to the counter-cyclical nature of food aid. For instance, since 2006 the World Food Programme (WFP) has developed a drought-insurance programme in Ethiopia in partnership with the French firm Axa Re. This pilot programme aims to provide cash payouts to farmers in the event of a severe drought.31 In 2007, WFP, the World Bank and the Government of Ethiopia began work on developing a broader risk-management framework for droughts and floods in the context of the Productive Safety Net Programme. The second phase (2008-10) will introduce a drought risk financing component to the programme and also include clearer contingency planning, capacity-building and more robust early-warning systems. Donors could commit to pay the insurance premiums, thus ensuring not only predictability at the recipient’s end, but also easier budgetary programming on the donors’ side. One of the attractive features of such mechanisms is that they encourage potentially food-insecure countries to put in place relatively ambitious social safety nets, including food safety nets, since these countries will not have to fear the fiscal costs linked to shocks like drought which, in the absence of an insurance mechanism, may make the safety nets unsustainable. Another advantage, particularly as regards weather-related insurance mechanisms, is that, if donors contribute to meet the costs of the premiums, this constitutes an incentive for them to transfer technologies to developing countries which could ease adaptation to climate change and limit its negative impacts. 19. The shift towards a more systematic needs-based approach to food aid would be consistent with the responses which are currently being shaped in order to address concerns that food aid may constitute a form of disguised export subsidy, and displace commercial imports. For 30 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights takes the view that States parties to the Covenant should provide aid in accordance with their ability to do so; see its general comment No. 12 (E/C.12/1999/5, para. 38). 31 Under the programme, Axa Re would have had to pay US$ 7.1 million to WFP in case of a serious drought in 2006 triggering the response - an event some estimate to occur every 20 years on average. The WFP would then have transferred the funds to the Government of Ethiopia to be disbursed as cash assistance to households.