A/HRC/10/5 page 8 B. Improving the definition of food aid commitments under the Food Aid Convention 12. The FAC is unique in that it imposes on its parties (or “Members”) binding obligations in relation to volumes of food aid they commit to provide, thus improving the predictability of this form of aid. Indeed, the objectives of the FAC are to “contribute to world food security and to improve the ability of the international community to respond to emergency food situations and other food needs of developing countries”, inter alia, by “making appropriate levels of food aid available on a predictable basis, as determined by the provisions of this Convention” (art. I). The Convention, in its article VIII, (e), provides that “to the maximum extent possible, non-emergency food aid shall be provided by members on a forward-planning basis, so that recipient countries may be able to take account, in their development programmes, of the likely flow of food aid they will receive during each year of this Convention”. 13. At the same time, the monitoring of compliance with these commitments remains weak. Members must provide yearly reports to the Food Aid Committee on their contributions.24 This information is processed and made available to the public in ways which are not sufficiently transparent to allow for an adequate scrutiny. The monitoring system is based on a peer review performed by the Food Aid Committee on the basis of the information provided by the members. The current system could be improved in two important respects. First, the information provided by the members about their contributions could be processed in a way which would facilitate the evaluation by any external observer of a State party’s compliance with its commitments, thus allowing in particular national parliaments and civil society organizations to contribute more effectively to a public debate about whether States deliver food aid in ways which are sufficiently predictable for the recipient States. Second, the evaluation of States’ compliance with their obligations under the FAC should include, as a matter of priority, their compliance with article XIII thereof, which makes explicit their obligation under international law to ensure that the aid they provide does not lead to violations of the right to food in the recipient country (see also below, chap. III). Both of these improvements could result from an amendment to the rules of procedure adopted by the Food Aid Committee. 14. A more fundamental issue related to the FAC relates to the mismatch between commitments and needs, and even more clearly, between the deliveries of food aid and need. Under the FAC, members express their commitments in terms of tons of wheat equivalent, in the value of wheat equivalent, or as a combination of tonnage and value. These commitments are made without being aligned with identified needs in recipient countries. In addition, in practice, food aid has often been counter-cyclical. States may carry over their commitments to the following year when they appear unable to meet their commitments for any single year, and they may carry forward their commitments to the following year for up to 5 per cent of their total commitment if their contribution exceeds their commitment for any single year (art. VI). This flexibility, combined with the fact that States budget their aid in monetary terms rather than in volume terms, may contribute to States delaying provision of aid when the prices are high on international markets, and to exceed their commitments when the prices are low - precisely the reverse of what would be needed if food aid were to truly contribute to food security. In sum, 24 Art. XIV, FAC, and rule 9 of the rules of procedure (FA (00/01) Misc.2 Restricted).