to the general population without ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the resources to take full advantage of those benefits bespeaks a thin and impoverished vision of s. 15(1). It is belied, more importantly, by the thrust of this Court's equality jurisprudence. Section 15(1) makes no distinction between laws that impose unequal burdens and those that deny equal benefits. The government will be required (at least at the s. 15(1) stage of analysis) to take special measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups are able to benefit equally from government services. If there are policy reasons in favour of limiting the government's responsibility to ameliorate disadvantage in the provision of benefits and services, those policies are more appropriately considered in determining whether any violation of s. 15(1) is saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The principle that discrimination can accrue from a failure to take positive steps to ensure that disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered to the general public is widely accepted in the human rights field. It is also a cornerstone of human rights jurisprudence that the duty to take positive action to ensure that members of disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered to the general public is subject to the principle of reasonable accommodation. In s. 15(1) cases this principle is best addressed as a component of the s. 1 analysis. Reasonable accommodation, in this context, is generally equivalent to the concept of "reasonable limits". It should not be employed to restrict the ambit of s. 15(1). The failure of the Medical Services Commission and hospitals to provide sign language interpretation where it is necessary for effective communication constitutes a prima facie violation of the s. 15(1) rights of deaf persons. This failure denies them the equal benefit of the law and discriminates against them in comparison with hearing persons. Although the standard set is broad, this is not to say that sign language interpretation will have to be provided in every medical situation. The "effective communication" standard is a flexible one, and will take into consideration such factors as the complexity and importance of the information to be communicated, the context in which the communications will take place and the number of people involved. For deaf persons with limited literacy skills, sign language interpretation can be surmised to be required in most cases. The application of the Oakes test requires close attention to the context in which the impugned legislation operates. In the present case, the failure to provide sign language interpreters would fail the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test under a deferential approach. It was, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether in this "social benefits" context, where the choice is between the needs of the general population and those of a disadvantaged group, a deferential approach should be adopted. At the same time, the leeway to be granted to the state is not infinite. Governments must demonstrate that their actions infringe the rights in question no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve their goals. In the present case, the government has manifestly failed to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation services for the deaf constituted a minimum impairment of their rights. Moreover, it is purely speculative to argue that the government, if required to provide interpreters for deaf persons, will also have to do so for other non-official language speakers,