[VOL. 48: 773, 2011] SocioeconomicRights and Theories ofJustice SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW these truths to be self evident."2 3 But theoretical work on justice gets underway when it becomes apparent that not all of the things that appear self-evident (one by one) to a person or to the members of a group of people or to a whole society or civilization can be held together, at least in unadulterated form. This fact has convinced some people that the language of rights is inappropriate for political discourse: "It is from the It lays down as a beginning to the end so much flat assertion .... fundamental and inviolable principle whatever is in dispute .... The strength of this argument is in proportion to the strength of lungs in those who use it." 24 But that is too extreme a reaction. Intuitive convictions about rights play a healthy role in stimulating theories of justice, and as we shall see, some of the conclusions of theorizing about justice are properly presented in the language of rights. III. SCARCITY AND ISSUES OF PRIORITY Some critics argue that even considered as commonsense precepts, claims about socioeconomic rights have to be rejected because they violate the logical principle that ought implies can.25 Many states, say these critics, do not have the resources to provide even minimal economic security for masses of their citizens, and because states differ considerably in this regard, it hardly makes sense to regard economic provision as a matter of universal human entitlement.26 A theory of justice will make this difficulty-if it is a difficulty-apparent at an early stage because its entire apparatus is predicated upon a presupposition of scarcity: like the limited altruism of human beings, the scarcity of material resources is a fact of life and a basic circumstance of all our talk about justice. 27 But the argument is too quick. It is true that the resources and services that socioeconomic rights need to draw upon are scarce relative to the whole set of demands that are placed upon them. But what this indicates is that there needs to be some sorting, balancing, and prioritization among these demands. It does not follow that one subset of the demands 23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 24. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies,in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 74 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). 25. See Waldron, supra note 16, at 506. 26. See, e.g., Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43, 50-51 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967). 27. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 109-12; see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 494-95 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch eds., 1978). 783