[VOL. 48: 773, 2011] Socioeconomic Rights and Theories ofJustice SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW that is our common heritage.3 8 Few are willing to say that property rights are justified utterly without reference to the interests or needs of those whom they exclude from access to resources. The reason is obvious: to justify a property right in X is not only to feel justified in oneself's coercively excluding others from X but to justify other people's recognition of a duty to refrain from using X even when one is not around oneself to physically defend it. My reason for including this lengthy consideration of Nozick's proviso is to help us see that a theory of justice may take on board compelling principles about human need in ways that are unfamiliar or disconcerting. We were expecting to see them surface as freestanding rights, yet here they surface as conditions or provisos on principles of historic entitlement. Someone may claim, of course, that although Nozick's proviso does represent a way of acknowledging the sort of needs that are also acknowledged in claims of socioeconomic rights, it is not an adequate way of acknowledging the force of such considerations. But that will have to be argued. We are not proceeding with any guarantee that the form in which welfare considerations emerge in a theory of justice exactly matches the form in which they present themselves in our considered judgments, in our commonsense precepts, or for that matter in some legal or internal formulations. Certainly, Nozick's way of thinking about the relation between the claims of need and claims related to property in the context of a theory of justice is not the only way we can think about this. In Part V, I shall consider the quite different way Rawls deals with these matters in chapter 5 of A Theory of Justice." Rawls's approach is probably more congenial to defenders of socioeconomic rights than Nozick's. But I have to say again: we are not entitled to take the emergence of a familiar-looking socioeconomic right as a criterion of adequacy for a theory of justice. Adequacy means that the relevant claims have been given proper consideration, not that the conclusion coincides with the views we began with. 38. For a survey, see THOMAS A. HORNE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POVERTY: POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN BRITAIN (1990). John Locke, for example, recognizes it by allowing a right of recourse to all property in the last resort for the needy. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 205-06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 39. See infra Part V. 787