[VOL. 48: 773, 20111 Socioeconomic Rights and Theories ofJustice SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW to commonsense precepts and our considered judgments about justice. It includes an account of the relation between justice and the theory of the person. In the elaboration of the theory's practical implications, there is the "four-stage sequence," there are theories of institutional competence and institutional responsibility, there is an argument about the pure procedural characteristics of what Rawls calls the basic structure, and there is a complex account of the relation between the two principles of justice as fairness and certain detailed theorems in public policy.9 All of this makes Rawls's theory a good paradigm for our purposes. As I said, this is not because it is the last word on justice. Rather, it is because the theory offers numerous possible points of access for argument about socioeconomic rights, making it interesting to consider where in this complex structure such arguments are most appropriately located. I think this consideration can be very helpful in political philosophy. Here is one way it can help: Some well-known theories of justice give the impression of being hostile to socioeconomic rights. Robert Nozick's theory of historical entitlement in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a good example.o If we want to figure out what to think about this hostilitywhether it is justified or whether it can be answered-we also have to ask, What is the proper relation between socioeconomic rights and a theory of justice? Only then can we assess whether a convincing case has been made by the theorist in question for denying that there is any justification for socioeconomic rights. You might think that it is unnecessary to confront questions like these or that confronting them is a purely academic exercise. If we are independently convinced that a case can be made for principles like those embodied in UDHR Article 23(1)11 or ICESCR Article 11(1),12 why should we care how that relates to a highly abstract theory like John Rawls's or to a conception of justice founded on principles known to be 8. 9. 10. See infra Part II. See infra Part VIII. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974); .Jeremy Waldron, Nozick andLocke: Filling the Space of Rights, 22 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81, 110 (2005). 11. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 1, at 75 ("[T]he right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment."). 12. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50 ("[Tlhe right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions."). 775