reasonableness standard, which directs attention to the gravity of the need, and the vulnerability of the rights-holder, makes proportionality – as principle, but not as structured test – inseparable from reasonableness review. In its most widely defended theoretical exposition, proportionality analysis asks the following set of sequential questions (although there are somewhat different versions of this test69), once a prima facie infringement of a constitutional right has been found. (1) First, did the infringement further a legitimate aim? (2) Second, was the measure necessary? In the most rigorous version of this test, the measure is necessary if and only if there are no alternative, less restrictive means. (3) Third, do the benefits of the measure outweigh the costs imposed on the rights-bearer? This part introduces the balancing stage of the inquiry. This is the proportionality analysis that has apparently travelled from German administrative law to German constitutional law,70 to Canadian Charter jurisprudence,71 to South Africa, New Zealand, Israel, Eastern Europe, and Central and South America, to the United Kingdom via Europe, and, of course,x to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.72 In accompanying the rights revolution 69 Compare e.g., Schlink, supra note 11 with Sadurski, supra note 62. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 5; c.f. Lorraine Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 83, 98-113 (Sujit Choudhry, ed., 2006) (grounding the postwar constitutional paradigm in the Warren era of the United States Supreme Court.) 71 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 72 See, e.g., Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 11, 75; Cohn, supra note 39. The route has often been circuitous: see Nicholas Blake, Importing Proportionality: Clarification or Confusion [2002] EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REPORTS 19, 23. 70 14