Although there is evidence of an effective operation of the minimum core and proportionality analysis in relation to economic and social rights in the Colombian context,101 it is easy to theorize that the combination of approaches would both remove the inflationary effects of proportionality analysis at the expense of rights perhaps most in need of an inclusive, solidaristic expression, and deprive economic and social rights of operation in any but grave or catastrophic circumstances.102 B. The Approach to Deference Second, the approaches to proportionality and reasonableness differ in the approach to deference. Judges relying on proportionality analysis often provide a “margin of appreciation” to ensure appropriate deference; judges relying on reasonableness review rest their approach on context-based criteria for the same purpose. In each of these approaches, the underlying problematic is the separation of powers problem common to all positive obligations flowing from economic and social rights: too little deference causes the court to usurp the democratically elected branches; too much abdicates the responsibility undergirding judicial review.103 101 David Landau, The Promise of a Minimum Core Approach: The Colombian Model for Judicial Review of Austerity Measures, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, 267, 284. Landau suggests that the Colombian Constitutional Court favors the vital minimum, or minimum core, as a concept in which to prioritize the interests of the poor, and proportionality analysis as a subsequent step in comparing the limitation with the government’s justification. 102 Cf. Bernal, supra note 89. Using the Hartian vocabulary of cores and penumbras, Barak offers the view that proportionality should be applied to the full scope, but the core is a useful accompanying concept: BARAK, supra note 63, 20. 103 For an apt description of this general problem, see Michelman, supra note 67. 24