MADALA J MADALA J: [38] I have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by Chaskalson P and the concurring judgment of Sachs J in this matter. I am in agreement with Chaskalson P’s very incisive analysis of the provisions of section 27 and in particular his conclusion that section 27(3) envisages a dramatic, sudden situation or event which is of a passing nature in terms of time. There is some suddenness and at times even an element of unexpectedness in the concept “emergency medical treatment”. I accordingly also agree that on that score the appellant’s case must fail since he has not persuaded us that section 27(3) applies. I, however, seek to make my own further observations about this case and now do so briefly. It is not necessary for me to restate the facts of the case as they have been set out succinctly in the judgment of Chaskalson P. Nor do I see the need to repeat in any detail the arguments that were advanced in the appeal. [39] In the oral submissions addressed to us, Mr Jacobs, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, placed reliance, among others, on the provisions of section 11 of the Constitution – the right to life. In this case life is indeed potentially at stake and this Court is enjoined therefore not only to find a humane and morally justified solution to the problem at hand, but also to examine assiduously the process by which the solution is reached and the legal foundation on which it rests. The state undoubtedly has a strong 21