actually did fulfill their core obligations, it would in most cases represent significant progress. The
purpose of the minimum state obligations approach is not to give states an escape hatch for avoiding
their responsibilities under the Covenant. It is in fact the opposite: a way to accommodate the reality
that many economic, social and cultural rights (and often civil and political rights as well) require
resources that are simply not available in poor countries. The minimum state obligations approach
affirms that even in highly strained circumstances, a state has irreducible obligations that it is
assumed to be able to meet. If it cannot, the burden of proof shifts to the state to justify its claim of
the need to cut back. By definition, minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of
resources or any other factors and difficulties" (Chapman 2007: 154).
Although the label chosen may be misleading ‐‐ the "violations approach" is not the only route by
which the rights of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can be interpreted to allow
for findings of "violations" to be made ‐‐, the intention behind the proposal is clear: it is to
strengthen the credibility of the monitoring of the Covenant, by adopting a position of restraint that
would allow the Committee to tackle only the most obvious cases, where the conduct of the
government is clearly below the standards of acceptability. However, approaching the enforceability
of economic and social rights by relying on the identification of a "core content" of each right, to
which certain "core obligations" would correspond, raises two major objections.
One concern is that the definition of such "core content" may appear arbitrary. This concern is most
explicitly detailed by Katharine Young in Chapter 10. Young notes that the "core content" of
economic and social rights listed in the Covenant is identified, alternatively, through four pathways,
to which different justifications correspond. In the language used by the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the "core content" often is described as a "needs‐based core", in which
the "core" is derived from the basic needs of the individual, and particularly his or her survival needs,
in line with the theories of development en vogue in the 1970s. A second approach is to define the
"core content" as a "value‐based core", in which its contours are based on what is required by
certain basic values such as the dignity of the individual, equality or freedom. A third approach is to
see the "core content" as the result of a consensus that gradually takes shape across jurisdictions,
across States (as expressed in international declarations in which governments profess their
attachment to certain "core" dimensions of economic and social rights), or across experts of the
concerned fields ‐‐ such as public health, education or housing ‐‐ that correspond to the rights of the
Covenant. Finally, a fourth approach would be to define the "core content" taking as a departure
point the corresponding obligations, and asking what can reasonably be demanded from the State
immediately, rather than being left to be subject to progressive realization: by paying attention to
the remedial dimension associated with the "core content", we would be able to define the "core"
based on what can practically be achieved.
Young concludes that none of these approaches is convincing in isolation, and that taken together,
they result in a doctrine that is neither principled nor, for that matter, legitimate. She finds that the
various functions that the "core content" approach to economic and social rights seeks to fulfil would
be better served by abandoning the approach altogether. Instead, she suggests, we should rely on
indicators and benchmarks to track progress in the realization of the rights and, where violations are
alleged to result from certain measures being adopted by States that infringe on the enjoyment of
economic and social rights, on classic notions of responsability and causality. She lands in a position
that is almost diametrically opposite to that of Chapman (see also Young 2012).
The theoretical foundations for the "core content" doctrine are fragile, and the critique by Young is in
that respect perfectly valid. It must be placed in perspective, however. The fact that there are
different motivations behind the doctrine, which results in a certain confusion about why, exactly,
certain elements are considered to form the "core" content of the rights listed in the Covenant,
simply means that the doctrine performs different functions at the same time; to each of the
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CRIDHO‐WP‐2013/2: O. De Schutter – Economic,Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights: An Introduction