successfully solved it; and to stamp a distinguished impression upon the pages of the history of this Commonwealth. Although adequate and additional funding is a necessary part of the contemplated procedure, money alone is not the answer. Efficiency of administration, curriculum, facilities, the ravages of inflation, and many other problems are extant and pleading for cure. This action should be remanded to the Franklin Circuit Court with direction to immediately issue writs of mandamus requiring the Governor to call an Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly; requiring the Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and members of the State Board of Education to recommend appropriate corrective measures; and requiring the General Assembly to enact legislation necessary to bring the Kentucky school system into compliance with ?183 of the Kentucky Constitution. WINTERSHEIMER, Justice, concurring. I concur with the majority opinion only to the extent that it holds that an efficient system of common schools has not been provided throughout the state. The General Assembly has not yet succeeded in achieving the constitutional goal directed by Section 183. I further specifically agree that the majority does not require the General Assembly to pass any law or authorize the adoption of any regulation. All that the General Assembly must do is comply with the constitutional direction to provide, through appropriate legislation, an efficient system of common schools throughout the state. I also agree with the majority that a class action is not properly before this Court. CR 23. I further concur with the opinion to the degree that it does not endorse the socalled Corns plan and that it condemns the use of the committee report and any payments in connection therewith. I concur that this Court does not retain any openended continuing jurisdiction. I agree that the finality of this decision should be withheld because to do otherwise would result in educational chaos to the degree that the system of common schools is unconstitutional. However, I would not give the General Assembly any particular deadline with the understanding that adjournment sine die contemplates adjournment without any future date being designated for resumption. This situation can easily be addressed procedurally by the legislature. I agree with the majority opinion when it cites Prowse v. Bd. of Education of Christian Co., 134 Ky. 365, 120 S.W. 307 (1909), in that a system that will be most efficient is for the judgment of the General Assembly. For similar statements of the law see City of Louisville v. Board of Education, 302 Ky. 647, 195 S.W.2d 291 (1946); Elliott v. Garner, 140 Ky. 157, 130 S.W. 997 (1910); Madison County Board of Education v. Smith, 250 Ky. 495, 63 S.W.2d 620 (1933). Such a matter is within the sound discretion of the General Assembly, and the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature and will not interfere with the actions of the legislature. My principal area of departure from the majority opinion relates to the matter of service on the members of the General Assembly. I do not believe that service on two members of the General Assembly acts as service on the remaining 136 members. The holding of the majority must be strictly limited to the unique circumstances presented in this case. This action is unique because this Court has not been asked to declare a single act of the legislature unconstitutional. Relief is sought by means of a declaration that the system is unconstitutional because it is not efficient. Clearly this Court does not have any authority to order the other members of the General Assembly to take any action when they have not been properly summoned