to local school districts to set local school tax rates may or may not work an improvement. Either way, certainly, it is beyond the scope of the relief sought by the appellees. It is the last thing they would want done, as they have said in no uncertain terms. Yet it is the only thing of a judicial nature that we have decided in our Majority Opinion, and it is beyond the parameters of this lawsuit. [FN2] [FN2. The Response to the Petition for Rehearing filed by the appellee, Council for Better Education, requests us to add this clarification to the Majority Opinion: "The record in this case clearly shows that no school district in Kentucky is overfunded. No district is funded to the level of the National average. Therefore, to take money from one district and give it to another would be a step toward a mediocre system statewide. This would violate Section 183 of the constitution and would not be approved by this Court." Perhaps, since we are prepared to enter the political arena, we should be prepared to go this extra mile.] We were only asked to decide one issue in this lawsuit: whether the General Assembly has responded adequately to its constitutional responsibility. This is a political question, pure and simple. We have undertaken to "enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 226, 82 S.Ct. at 715. Without such standards, a case is not justiciable. It is not enough to decide that Kentucky does not have an "efficient system of common schools throughout the State," as Section 183 of the Constitution requires, without specifying what statutes are unconstitutional, and why. Yet, the former is not asked, and the latter is not possible. I repeat, this case is not justiciable. II. THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE PARTIES Essentially, the plaintiffs comprise two groups, one consisting of sixty-six local school districts represented through the Council for Better Education plus seven more school districts specifically named, and a second consisting of twenty-two public school students suing as individuals. Turning first to the school districts, it should be obvious from a legal standpoint that these school districts have no authority to sue the General Assembly, their creator, over the circumstances of their existence. As stated in Board of Ed. of Louisville v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson County, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 6, 8-9, (1970), quoted but disregarded in the Majority Opinion: "Certainly there are no constitutional guarantees that local school districts, which are purely creatures of the legislature in their creation and alteration, must be regarded by the legislature as autonomous fiefdoms for all purposes, particularly in face of the plenary power vested in the legislature by section 183 of the Constitution of Kentucky as regards the common schools of the state. Id. at 8. This would seem to be conclusive of the matter. But if a case factually to the point is needed, East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133 Mich.App. 132, 348 N.W.2d 303 (1984), should be persuasive. In a suit seeking to declare Michigan's school financing unconstitutional because it produced unequal per student funding between districts, the Michigan court held, inter alia, that the school districts did not have standing "to defy their creator over the terms of their existence... [o]r to expend public funds to finance such litigation." 348 N.W.2d at 306. We should hold the same. Cases from other jurisdictions cited to the contrary, and footnoted in our Majority Opinion, are without exception fundamentally unsound as judicial precedents because they fail to address this question. They also fail to deal with the inherent limitations upon the scope of judicial activity and the constitutional limitations mandated by the doctrine of separation of powers.