(1959); Kaufman v. Humphrey, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 575 (1959). Thus, even had we the power to order the General Assembly to enact new or different legislation on the subject of school financing or management of the public school system, it is beyond our power to suggest what the remedial legislation should be. We have exceeded the judicial power vested in the Court of Justice by Section 109 of the Constitution and violated the doctrine of separation of powers constitutionalized in Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. At the heart of this case is the problem created by the uneven tax base for support in a public school system that is built on local property taxes. This problem is not unique to our state. Supreme courts from several of our sister states, confronted with this problem and caught up in a rush of judicial activism, have attempted to intervene judicially in the legislative process. None have undertaken to intervene where the issues were as nonspecific as presented here, and thus as incapable of judicial resolution. Further, as subsequent cases from West Virginia and New Jersey attest, when they intervened in the process their initial rulings were just the beginning of a long-running dialogue. They have been confronted with complex sequels to original decisions that did not improve matters significantly in the first place. They have been inundated with subsequent litigation. An appreciation of the difference between legislative and judicial lawmaking is essential to maintaining constitutionally mandated separation of powers. Speaking to the constitutional limitations inherent in the separation of powers doctrine, in Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700, 709 (1982), the United States Supreme Court explains that the "actual controversies" principle: "at an irreducible minimum ... requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' [Citation omitted], and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,' [Citation omitted].... [J]udicial power [is limited] 'to those disputes which confine ... courts to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.' " [Emphasis added.] The case now before us fails to meet this "irreducible minimum" necessary to invoke judicial power. This same concept is thus explained by legal historian G. Edward White of the University of Virginia School of Law in his recent book, The American Judicial Tradition, 2d ed., p. 461 (1988): "The power of judges pertains only to those matters peculiarly 'legal,' as distinguished from political.... [T]he burden of judicial opinion-writing, then, has been to show that a decision has not been grounded on other than 'legal' considerations, and that within that ambit it analyzes legal issues in an intelligible fashion." Since publication of the initial Majority Opinion three months ago, the predominant reaction from the public, the press, and the politicians, has been that our decision provides the Governor and General Assembly an unprecedented opportunity to reform a deficient state educational process. The operative word is "opportunity," not "power," because the General Assembly has always had the same "power" it has now to reform the system. We have not enhanced its power. Unfortunately, providing opportunities at the expense of the integrity of the judicial process is not a traditional item on the judicial agenda, nor in my view an appropriate role for the courts. Our Majority Opinion is fundamentally unsound, not because there is no problem but because the case does not present issues capable of judicial resolution. We have now become part of the problem when we intend to be part of the solution.