school. The trial court denied the request, but our predecessor Court reversed and granted the requested injunction. In language which brings together and reemphasizes earlier decisions, we said, "The fundamental mandate of the Constitution and Statutes of Kentucky is that there shall be equality and that all public schools shall be nonpartisan and nonsectarian. Uniformity does not require equal classification but it does demand that there shall be a substantially uniform system and equal school facilities without discrimination as between different sections of a district or a county." Id. at 565 (references omitted). The lack of uniformity and the unequal educational opportunity existing in the county was said to constitute "a violation of both the spirit and intent of Section 183 of our State Constitution." Id. That reasoning therein applies, a fortiori, to the entire state system of common schools. Public schools must be efficient, equal and substantially uniform. As can be seen, this Court, since the adoption of the present Constitution, has, in reflecting on Section 183, drawn several conclusions: 1) The General Assembly is mandated, is duty bound, to create and maintain a system of common schools-throughout the state. 2) The expressed purpose of providing such service is vital and critical to the well being of the state. 3) The system of common schools must be efficient. 4) The system of common schools must be free. 5) The system of common schools must provide equal educational opportunities for all students in the Commonwealth. 6) The state must control and administer the system. 7) The system must be, if not uniform, "substantially uniform," with respect to the state as a whole. 8) The system must be equal to and for all students. Finally, a Federal Court has stated the financial burden entailed in meeting these responsibilities in no way lessens the constitutional duty. Carroll v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 410 F.Supp. 234 (W.D.Ky.1976), aff'd 561 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.1977). "In short, once the citizens of Kentucky made the voluntary commitment to educate the children of this state in public schools neither the Kentucky General Assembly nor those individuals responsible for discharging the duties imposed on them by the state constitution ... can abrogate those duties merely because the monetary obligations becomes unexpectedly large or onerous." Id. at 238. The taxpayers of this state must pay for the system, no matter how large, even to the point of being "unexpectedly large or even onerous." Before proceeding, therefore, to a definition of "efficient" we must address a point made by the appellants with respect to our authority to enter this fray and to "stick our judicial noses" into what is argued to be strictly the General Assembly's business. Appellants argue and cite several cases to support their position, that the General Assembly has sole and exclusive authority to determine whether the system of common schools is constitutionally "efficient" and that a Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the General Assembly. In Prowse v. Board of Education for Christian County, 134 Ky. 365, 120 S.W. 307 (1909), the constitutionality of an act requiring the fiscal court to enact a tax previously set by the board of education for local school operation was upheld. We said, in light of Section 183: "What system will be most efficient is for the judgment of the General Assembly.... In a matter like this, resting within the discretion of the General Assembly, the Court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the General Assembly and it will not interfere with the action of the legislature, unless a palpable effort to evade the mandate of the Constitution should appear." 120 S.W. at 308. [FN17] [FN17. See also, Board of Education of Louisville v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1970) (determining