This final order entered on October 14, 1988, and, cumulated with the first two documents, constitutes the subject matter of this appeal. Addressing the committee report, but steadfastly maintaining that the report adopted was only part of his decision, the court agreed that the goals set out by the committee for the establishment of an "efficient" school system were "salutary" ones. While not technically adopting the report as part of this final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, it is clear that the trial court did, indeed, adopt certain principles from the Committee's report. In his additional Findings of Fact, the judge modified his previous definition of an "efficient" system of schools. It is a "... tax supported, coordinated organization, which provides a free, adequate education to all students throughout the state, regardless of geographical location or local fiscal resources." He opined that an efficient system (of schools) must have "substantial" uniformity. Ever broadening the definition and setting non-instructional standards, the trial court required an efficient school system to provide sufficient physical facilities, teachers, support personnel, and instructional materials to enhance the educational process. An adequate school system must also include careful and comprehensive supervision at all levels to monitor personnel performance and minimize waste. If and where waste and mismanagement exist, including but not limited to improper nepotism, favoritism, and mis-allocation of school monies, they must be eliminated, through state intervention if necessary. The General Assembly has all the power necessary to guarantee that the resources provided by Kentucky taxpayers for schools are spent wisely. The trial court thus, with a very broad brush, included in its constitutional definition of "efficient" goals to be met by an education and requirements as to school financing, curriculum, personnel, accessibility to all children, physical facilities, instructional materials and management of the schools. Moreover, the trial court made it clear that the duty--the absolute, unequivocal duty-to provide this system is solely the responsibility of the General Assembly. The court reiterated that its judicial power did not extend to specifying to the General Assembly the methods by which to implement and maintain this efficient system of education. Addressing again the question of financing this massive task, the trial court stated directly what had been implied previously, that "substantial additional monies" will have to be raised to provide this constitutional school system. The court suggested three possible ways of financing: 1) increasing existing taxes, 2) levying new taxes, or 3) reallocating existing funds. Since a major reallocation of funds would "cripple" other government functions, the trial court postulated that the imposition of new taxes appeared to be the only viable alternative. The trial judge agreed that the separation of powers doctrine would prohibit courts from directing the General Assembly as to how the school system should be financed. But, he reiterated that the General Assembly must provide an efficient system. Finally, although the trial court encouraged the protection of local school boards, he re-emphasized the General Assembly's authority and responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of the school system. In the "judgment," the trial judge retained continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter for the purpose of enforcing the judgment. To that effect, he ordered a progress report be made to him on a day certain. With this lengthy and dramatic series of documents, the Franklin Circuit Court brought into sharp focus a problem that many dedicated citizens of the Commonwealth have "wrestled" with for many years. It placed the sole responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient system on the General