value of all taxable property in each local school district. That data is certified to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Superintendent determines annually the maximum tax rate that the PEP fund will equalize and then applies an equal rate to all districts. In order for a local district to receive funds, each local school district must levy a minimum equivalent tax rate of 25 cents per $100 of valuation, or the maximum rate supported by the PEP, whichever is greater. The "minimum equivalent tax rate" is defined as the quotient derived from dividing the districts' previous year's income from tax levies by the total assessed property valuation plus the assessment for motor vehicles. As pointed out by the trial court, the mandated underlying tax rate has been so low that the results have been that only a fraction of the 25 cents local tax is actually equalized through the PEP. [FN10] [FN10. Nine cents per hundred in 1985-86, 10 cents per hundred in 1986-87, and 13 cents per hundred thereafter.] If one were to summarize the history of school funding in Kentucky, one might well say that every forward step taken to provide funds to local districts and to equalize money spent for the poor districts has been countered by one backward step. It is certainly true that the General Assembly, over the years, has made substantial efforts to infuse money into the system to improve and equalize the educational efforts in the common schools of Kentucky. What we must decide, based solely on the evidence in the record as tested by the Kentucky Constitution, Section 183, is whether the trial court was correct in declaring that those efforts have failed to create an efficient system of common schools in this Commonwealth. V. THE EVIDENCE As we proceed to summarize the evidence before us, the legal test we must apply is whether that evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court that the Kentucky system of common schools is not efficient. [FN11] It is textbook law that before an appellate court may overturn the trial court's finding, such finding must be clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Yates v. Wilson, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 458 (1960). [FN11. Obviously, we will consider (later in the opinion) as a legal proposition, whether the trial court's definition of "efficient" within the aegis of Kentucky Constitution, Section 183 is correct.] The evidence in this case consists of numerous depositions, volumes of oral evidence heard by the trial court, and a seemingly endless amount of statistical data, reports, etc. We will not unduly lengthen this opinion with an extensive discussion of that evidence. As a matter of fact, such is really not necessary. The overall effect of appellants' evidence is a virtual concession that Kentucky's system of common schools is under-funded and inadequate; is fraught with inequalities and inequities throughout the 177 local school districts; is ranked nationally in the lower 20-25% in virtually every category that is used to evaluate educational performance; and is not uniform among the districts in educational opportunities. When one considers the evidence presented by the appellants, there is little or no evidence to even begin to negate that of the appellees. The tidal wave of the appellees' evidence literally engulfs that of the appellants. In spite of the Minimum Foundation Program and the Power Equalization Program, there are wide variations in financial resources and dispositions thereof which result