VAN DER WESTHUIZEN J [87] The present challenge deals with section 9(1) and section 26(2) of the Constitution. The concepts of rationality82 and reasonableness are thus central. A policy which is irrational could hardly be reasonable. Whether a policy which meets the requirements for rationality would necessarily be reasonable does not have to be decided here. [88] In the area of the right of access to adequate housing, of which the provision of temporary or emergency accommodation is a part, the question is essentially one of reasonableness. The availability of resources is an important factor in determining the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the progressive realisation of the right.83 This does not mean that the state may arbitrarily decide which measures to implement. The measures taken must be reasonable. While there will be a range of possible measures that may be reasonable and the Court will not set aside a policy for the mere reason that other measures may have been more desirable or favourable, the enquiry must still take place.84 [89] A policy that, for example, differentiates between general housing needs and emergency situations might well be understandable. The question is whether it is reasonable to differentiate within the category of emergencies between people 82 In Harksen above n 38 at para 43 Goldstone J, interpreting section 8(1) of the interim Constitution, posed the question whether the differentiating measure bears a rational connection to a legitimate governmental purpose. 83 Grootboom above n 12 at para 46. See also Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal [1997] ZACC 17; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at para 11 where Chaskalson P held that both the obligations imposed and rights conferred by section 26 are limited by the availability of resources. 84 Grootboom above n 12 at para 41. 41