important step toward productive citizenship for incarcerated people, former addicts, and others. 32. Other State courts have reached a similar conclusion (e.g. Abbott v Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 373-374, 575 A.2d 359, 402-403 [1990]). 33. James S. Coleman, US Dept of Health, Educ & Welfare, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966). 34. See Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale LJ 249, 291-293 (1999); Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks of Emphasizing Input Equity Over School Performance, 6 Va J Soc Policy & L 11, 27 (1998). 35. See e.g. Ryan, op. cit., at 292-293. 36. Defendants' trial evidence volume accompanying posttrial brief ¶ 345. 37. During his direct testimony Dr. Hanushek stated more than once that this data was from "1996 and 1997." However, it does not appear from this testimony that he meant to imply that he had culled observations from two contiguous school years (e.g., 1995-1996 and 1996-1997). Exhibits used by Dr. Hanushek during his direct testimony and his testimony on cross-examination make it clear that this analysis concerned observations for a single school year (1996-1997). 38. Schools were included in this analysis only if they scored above (or below) the mean on both math and reading exams, i.e., no school that was above average on one type of exam, and below average on the other, was included. By using this criterion Dr. Hanushek sought to clearly differentiate highand-low-performing schools. 39. Defendants' trial evidence volume accompanying posttrial brief ¶ 648, n 100. 40. Defendants argue that the CWR understates New York City's wealth because (1) New York City has a greater proportion of residents with capital invested in securities and other instruments that is not captured by the CWR measurement, (2) New York City has a greater capacity than other jurisdictions to impose taxes on nonresidents, and (3) New York City has a greater proportion of residents who itemize on their Federal income tax forms, allowing them to deduct their local taxes. Defendants did not present any evidence quantifying these effects. With respect to New York City's ability to "export" taxes, that power is subject to the approval of the State. Occasionally, on its own instance, the State has reduced the City's ability to tax nonresidents. The State exercised this power recently when it revoked the City's authority to levy an income tax on commuters. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants did not demonstrate that the CWR understates the City's wealth. 41. In fiscal year 1997 BOE had a $226 million budget surplus. In fiscal year 1998 BOE had a $259 million surplus. In fiscal year 1999 BOE had a $212 million surplus. 42. Dr. Alter is a professor of educational psychology and Chairman of the Department of Teaching and Learning at the School of Education at New York University. 43. As discussed above State aid formulas weight certain students, such as at-risk students, more heavily to account for particular educational needs. Others are weighted less heavily, such as kindergarten students who spend only a half day in school. A weighted pupil count reflects the State's assessment of a district's particular needs based on information about pupils. 44. As used herein, "minority" refers to students with one or more of the following ethnic backgrounds: African-American, Latino, Asian-American and Native American/Pacific Islander. 45. Amended complaint ¶ 84. 46. Looking at State and local aid in combination, New York City schools have historically spent less per student than the State's average. SED has reported for more than a decade that the New York City public school system spends substantially less per weighted pupil than the State average. In 1997-1998, for example, all major school districts except New York City spent $8,546 per weighted pupil. New York City spent $7,299, or $1,247 less, per weighted pupil. This discrepancy also appears when measured in terms of expenditures per enrolled pupil. In 1997-1998 New York City spent approximately $8,788 per enrolled pupil. The average for districts in the rest of the State was $10,342 per pupil. 47. See defendants' exhibits 19383-19386. 48. See memorandum of law in support of motion by State of New York and Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Roth for judgment dismissing plaintiff's (sic) claims under title VI implementing regulations, dated July 6, 1999, at 30; affidavit of Michael J. Wolkoff in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, sworn to July 1, 1999, ¶ 15, and exhibit B, at 14. 49. Indeed, defendants' trial evidence volume accompanying brief contains a different calculation of State aid per enrolled non-New York City student for 1996-1997 than does plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Compare defendants' trial evidence volume accompanying brief, at 290, n 101, with plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, vol II, at 1067, ¶ 2045, and Dr. Berne's testimony, at 22610-22611.) 50. There is currently some division among the Federal courts as to whether a defendant's burden is one merely of production or one of proof. Some courts seem to assume that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991 did not, for title VI cases, reverse the "burden of production" rule set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio (490 U.S. 642, 659-660 [1989]; see Cureton v National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 37 F.Supp.2d 687, 697 [1999], revd on other grounds 198 F.3d 107; see also Graham v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn., 1995 WL 115890, *17, n 5, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 3211, *38, n 5 [ED Tenn, Feb. 20, 1995, Edgar, J.] [noting continuing effect of Wards Cove is "unclear"], appeal dismissed 107 F.3d 870; cf. Elston v Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1412 [1993] [burden of proof shifts]). It appears to this court that the better argument is that the explicit provision of the Civil Rights Restoration Act shifting the burden of proof to defendants in title VII cases applies by long-standing precedent to analogous antidiscrimi-nation laws such as title VI. That is how this court reads the Court of Appeals 1995 decision (see 86 N.Y.2d 307, 323, supra). 51. Defendants' trial evidence volume accompanying posttrial brief ¶ 655.