A/HRC/25/50/Add.1 20. To keep within the euro zone guidelines, previous Governments had, for many years and with the help of foreign banks, also misreported the national economic statistics, as did a number of other European Governments. In early 2010, it emerged that, with the help of Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and other banks, specific derivatives were developed so that the actual level of debt and deficits could be hidden and Greece could gain entry into the euro zone.20 21. The global financial crisis of 2008 had a profound impact on tourism and shipping, two of the country’s largest industries; in 2009, revenues sank by 15 per cent.21 In this context, lending to the country increased to help cope it with the impact of lower tax revenues and the need for higher government spending.22 22. In October 2009, the newly elected Government of George Papandreou revealed that that previous Governments had been underreporting the budget deficit. The new Government revised the overall fiscal deficit for 2009 from 5 per cent to 13.5 per cent of GDP (and subsequently to 15.6 per cent). The figure for Government debt at the end of 2009 was also revised from €269.3 billion (113 per cent of GDP) to €299.7 billion (130 per cent).23 23. From November 2009, Greece suffered several speculative waves, raising the interest rate on sovereign debt to prohibitively high levels. The deteriorating fiscal results led to downgrades of Government bonds by credit rating agencies in late April 2010. In effect, this curtailed the State’s access to the international financial markets. To avoid defaulting on its debt, Greece turned to the European Union and IMF for financial assistance. B. The bailout programme 24. In May 2010, Greece agreed a €110 billion loan at market-based interest rates with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and IMF.24 The loan was conditional on Greece implementing an economic adjustment programme entailing €30 billion of fiscal cuts over the period 2010-2014. The programme, which had the two broad objectives of making fiscal policy and the fiscal and debt situation sustainable, and improving competitiveness,25 consisted of three main components: the implementation of austerity measures to restore the fiscal balance; the privatization of State assets worth €50 20 21 22 23 24 25 8 See for example Beat Balzli, “Greek debt crisis: how Goldman Sachs helped Greece to mask its true debt”, Spiegel Online International, 8 February 2010, available from www.spiegel.de/international/europe/greek-debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-greece-tomask-itstrue-debt-a-676634.html. Harris A. Samaras, “Greece unlikely to escape its worst financial crisis of modern times!”, Pytheas Market Focus, July 2009 (available from www.pytheas.net/docs/20090724-Greece-unlikely-toescape-its-worst-financial-crisis-of-modern-times.pdf), p. 2. By early 2010, French, German and British banks had lent more than €70 billion to Greece. Even before the statistics were revised, Greece had exceeded during the period 2000-2010, the euro zone stability criteria, with the annual deficits exceeding the maximum limit of 3 per cent of GDP and the debt level significantly above the limit of 60 per cent of GDP. IMF was to provide €30 billion under a stand-by arrangement, while euro zone countries would provide €80 billion. IMF Country Report No. 13/154 (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13154.pdf), p. 5. See also IMF, Greece: Request for Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 10/111, May 2010 (available from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10111.pdf), p. 4.