critique in her article already cited, though with a more ideological spin. She writes that "the minimalist focus within the core may well legitimate neoliberalism, especially if the claim for the minimum core is made in order to increase the bundles of commodities or consumption share of the disadvantaged, while failing to challenge the underlying economic institutions which have produced the disadvantage in the first place".70 Indeed, by focusing on the core content of economic and social rights -- providing the poor and marginalized with the essential minimum that they require to live healthy lives in dignity --, while neglecting the other requirements associated with the progressive realization of the promises of the Covenant, we do not question the structures that cause the poverty and marginalization of the victims in the first place: we leave them untouched, while guaranteeing a "floor" to the individual that avoids him or her falling permanently into extreme poverty.71 More recently -- troubled, perhaps, by such critiques -- Chapman recognized that her "violations approach" should, perhaps more suitably, be treated as just one methodology among others: "It is obviously important to go beyond a 'violations approach' so as to provide a positive guideline on how best to implement the rights in question, and to assess whether particular states parties are making reasonable progress in improving their human rights implementation".72 To "go beyond" the "violations approach", in this context, can only mean one thing : to abandon it, once it is recognized that this approach betrays the originality of the duty of States to "progressively realize" the rights listed in the Covenant, which requires a permanent, and potentially limitless, effort to make them more real. 2. The "outcomes-based approach" to the Covenant There is another escape route from the "progressive realization" clause : it is to focus all our attention on the situation of the individual (on his or her achievements, one might say in Sen's terminology73), rather than on whether or not the State has put enough resources into improving that situation. Indeed, one may be tempted to argue, from the point of view of the individual rights-holder, outcomes matter, not means. He or she cares not about how public policies are shaped, for instance, but about whether housing, education and healthcare are affordable and of decent quality. Should it matter whether the State chooses to ensure such outcomes not by investing public resources, but by trusting private service providers ? Consider a State in which the public sector represents a small proportion of the GDP, and in which redistributive policies and spending for social policies are weak, but in which the outcomes are satisfactory. Should such a State be seen as acting in violation of its undertakings under the Covenant, although according to standard development indicators, the levels of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights are relatively high compared to similarly situated countries? To answer, we must understand how outcomes cannot be fully separated from how, and by whom, the goods and services essential to the enjoyment of such rights are delivered. It is true of course that States are recognized broad discretion as to how they should discharge their duties under the Convention. Except for certain provisions that define which steps States should take,74 the Covenant 70 Young, "The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content", cited above note 66, at 174. 71 There is a troubling analogy between the "core content" approach to economic and social rights and the "negative income tax" proposed by Milton Friedman as the measure that would be best suited to combat poverty without distorting the market and creating the wrong incentives: see M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2002 (originally published in 1962), chapter XII. Young does not draw this analogy, however. Rather, she refers on this point to the work of Philip Harvey, who argues that economic and social rights challenge the utility maximization norm that is at the core of neo-classical economics and utilitarianism more generally (Philip Harvey, "Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Human Rights Seriously", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 33 (2002), 363; and Philip Harvey, "Aspirational Law", Buffalo Law Review, vol. 52 (2004), 701-726, at 705). Whatever the approach, it is clear that the subversive dimension of economic and social rights is that they are more than simply a relief measure, making tolerable the exclusion otherwise produced by the market mechanisms; it is this dimension that might be lost if we content ourselves with an approach focused on the "core content". 72 Chapman, "The Status of Efforts to Monitor Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", cited above note 46, 156. 73 See in particular Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1985). 74 For instance, to adopt "technical and vocational guidance and training programmes" for the fulfilment of the right to work (Art. 6, para. 2), or to "disseminat[e] knowledge of the principles of nutrition" and to " [develop or reform] agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources" to guarantee freedom from hunger (Art. 11, para. 2, b)). It follows from such prescriptions, that address not only the result to be achieved but also the 15