based only on certain vague provisions of the constitution or found in international law, it is more easily accepted that they intervene to protect existing entitlements, or that they impose "negative duties" to refrain from diminishing existing levels of enjoyment of rights. However, it is precisely then -- when they act to preserve the droits acquis or the entitlements that individuals already enjoy, as it were -- that the courts contribute the least to strengthening the position of the most powerless, because the poorest among the poor simply have no entitlements to be protected.42 There we must go further. But can we? May we equip courts and other human rights mechanisms with the tools they need to assess macroeconomic policies, resource mobilization and spending choices, so that the economic, social and cultural rights of the poor are finally prioritized? It is tempting to answer that we need not. The next Part examines two arguments according to which the quest to define the duties of States as regards resource mobilization and spending is, in effect, a distraction -- unnecessary at best, and at worst undermining the credibility of economic, social and cultural rights as rights. One argument is that we need to model the supervision of compliance with economic, social and cultural rights on that of the more classic civil and political rights, adopting what has been called a "violations approach" to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.43 Another argument is that outcomes are all that matter : we should focus all our attention on the level of enjoyment of economic, soical and cultural rights, and waste no time considering whether that level is reached thanks to the efforts deployed by the State, or through the workings of the market and other actors' initiatives. The two arguments are examined in turn. III. Escaping the Burden of Progressive Realization 1. The "violations approach" to the Covenant In an influential article published twenty years ago, Audrey Chapman takes the view that human rights lawyers should abandon the quest for a benchmark by which to assess "progressive realization".44 This search, ultimately, risks undermining the task of monitoring itself, distracting us from the more urgent task of addressing the most egregious violations of economic and social rights. Instead, a "more feasible and effective alternative" would consist in focusing on "three types of violations: (1) violations resulting from actions and policies on the part of governments; (2) violations related to patterns of discrimination; and (3) violations taking place due to a state's failure to fulfill the minimum core obligations contained in the Covenant".45 In later publications, Chapman insisted that this focus did not mean lowering the bar for States. Quite to the contrary, in her view : "[If] states actually did fulfill their core obligations, it would in most cases represent significant progress. The purpose of the minimum state obligations approach is not to give states an escape hatch for avoiding their responsibilities under the Covenant. It is in fact the opposite: a way to accommodate the reality that many economic, social and cultural rights (and often civil and political rights as well) require resources that are simply not available in poor countries. The minimum state obligations approach affirms that even in highly strained circumstances, a state has irreducible obligations that it is assumed to be able to meet. If it cannot, the burden of proof shifts to the state to justify its claim of the need to cut back. By definition, minimum core 42 See, for a similar critique in the domestic constitutional context, David Landau, 'The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement', Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 53(1) (2012): 189-247 (noting the paradox that it is precisely where the courts intervene with the greatest legitimacy, by preserving existing entitlements or prohibiting steps backwards in the realization of economic and social rights, that they are least able to bring about the kind of social change that would truly benefit the disempowered and the marginalized). 43 Audrey R. Chapman, "‘Violations Approach’ for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18(1) (1996), pp. 23-66. See also the editors' introduction to Audrey R. Chapman and Sage Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Oxford, New York: Intersentia, 2002). 44 Chapman, "‘Violations Approach’ for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", cited above note 43, at 23. 45 Chapman, "‘Violations Approach’ for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", cited above note 43, at 23. 10