not to exercise scrutiny of budgetary choices on the basis of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility that the requirement of "progressive realization" can only be imposed once all the methodological issues and normative contests associated with analysing public budgets in the light of the Covenant are settled. While public budget analysis contains considerable potential, it should not be a precondition for treating the rights of the Covenant as human rights -- recognized and fully institutionalized as such, and enforced by accountability mechanisms, including courts.5 Although the exact scope of the courts' powers to enforce the rights of the Covenant depends ultimately on the domestic legal system of each State party and how it separates powers between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, courts at the very least should be allowed to intervene to prohibit any discrimination in the enjoyment of Covenant rights; to demand from States that abstain from imposing measures that impose limitations to Covenant rights, unless the conditions set out in Article 4 of the Covenant are complied with -- which requires in particular that such limitations are justified by the need to promote public welfare in a democratic society and that they do not affect the nature of the rights of the Covenant6 --; and that any retrogressive step be justified as necessary and proportionate the fulfilment of the full range of rights protected by the Covenant. This is especially important to recall once we take into account that the formulation of Article 2, para. 1, of the Covenant, presupposes a certain understanding of the relationship between the realization of rights and wealth creation within a certain polity. There must be wealth available, it is suggested, before it can be invested in certain social goods and services or redistributed: resources are a precondition for progressive social policies. Keynesian economic thinking, however -- which as we know did not start with the publication of J. Maynard Keynes' General Theory in 19367 --, suggests that the reverse logic is at least as equally valid: social expenditures are a condition for sustainable economic growth, and they should be seen therefore, rather than as a burden on the economy, as an investment. Moreover, we now understand much better that it would be a mistake to pursue growth strategies if this is at the expense of social investment or redistributive strategies: James Heckman for instance has illustrated this in his work on investment in early childhood education,8 and Angus Deaton has noted that countries shifting their focus from social investments to economic growth (i.e., seeing growth as a pre-condition for social investment rather than as the outcome of investing in populations) were 5 See the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Mr Philip Alston, to the 32nd session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/32/31) (28 April 2016) (highlighting how, in practice, economic, social and cultural rights have been marginalized in comparison to civil and political rights, and proposing a recognition, institutionalization and accountability (RIA) framework -- focusing primary attention on ensuring recognition of the rights, institutional support for their promotion and accountability mechanisms for their implementation -- as a means to overcome the neglect of economic, social and cultural rights as human rights). 6 Article 4 of the Covenant reads: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society". 7 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936). The key policy recommendations that followed from keynesian macroeconomics were foreshadowed in the United States by authors such as Stuart Chase or John Maurice Clark, who were among the main intellectual influences behind the Second New Deal launched by President F.D. Roosevelt in 1935. Like Keynes, these authors saw inequalities and the lack of purchasing power of the poor as the key obstacle to the ability of the economy to overcome depression, which, again like Keynes, they explained by underinvestment. Thus, Stuart Chase expressed the view in 1932 that "It is not so much overproduction as underconsumption which is the appalling fact. ... Millions of tons of additional material could readily be marketed if purchasing power were available. Alas, purchasing power is not available" (Stuart Chase, A New Deal (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 3). Clark argued that spending on public works could be "antidote to oversaving" and could "increase general purchasing power in order to offset the decrease due to industrial contraction" (see John M. Clark, Economics of Planning Public Works (Washington: The National Planning Board, 1935), pp. 155-159). For an excellent intellectual history of the New Deal policies, see Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform. New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 8 James Heckman insisted, in countless publications, on four messages: skills and social abilities such as attentiveness, persistence and an ability to work with others are developed at an early age and are essential for productivity in adult life; early investment in childhood if far more cost-effective than remedial measures taken at a later stage; society as a whole shall face enormous economic and social burdens if disadvantaged families are not provided more support for early childhood development; and such investment provides significant returns to society through increased personal achievement and social productivity. See in particular James J. Heckman, Giving Kids a Fair Chance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). 4