XX ECJ, Case C-370/01, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, at. 158. ECJ, Case C-370/01, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, at 162, and ECJ, Cases C-8/15 to C-10/95, Ledra, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, at 56. XXII Luxembourg common courts have also jurisdiction regarding disputes emerging from the loan agreement adopted between the Commission, the Portuguese government and the Bank of Portugal (Article 14, n.º 2, executive version of 24 and 25 May 2012, available at www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_portugal_ffa.pdf). XXIII ECJ, Case C-370/01, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, at 173-174. XXIV See Article 199 (g) of the Portuguese Constitution. This provision was invoked to justify the competence of the Government to sign both the MoU and the loan agreements with the IMF, the EFSM and the EFSF (see Resolution 8/2011, published in Diário da República, II Série, 95, 17 May 2011). It is also mentioned in an opinion of the Portuguese Secretary of State for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers that endorses the constitutionality of both the MoU and the loan agreements (see paras. 13 e 14 of the opinion included in Annex II to the loan agreement signed between the Commission, the Portuguese Government and the Bank of Portugal; executive version of 24 and 25 May 2012, available at www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_portugal_ffa.pdf). At least regarding the competence to adopt the loan agreements, the opinion of the Secretary of State is not in accordance with Article 161 (h) of the Constitution that requires the Government to ask for Parliament´s authorization ‘to contract and grant loans and engage in other lending operations, apart from floating debt operations, laying down the general terms and conditions governing such loans and lending operations, and setting the upper limit for guarantees to be given by the Government in any given year’. XXV The Portuguese President ratifies international treaties [Article 135 (b) of the Constitution] and signs resolutions of the Parliament and from the Council of Ministers that approve international agreements [Article 134 (b) of the Constitution]. XXVI ‘Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member States Meeting within the Council of the European Union’, published as Note 9614/10 of the General Secretariat of the Council, p. 2, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09/st09614.pt10.pdf. XXVII This provision authorizes the Council to adopt specific measures to those Member States whose currency is the Euro with the scope of: i) strengthening the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline; and ii) setting out economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that they are compatible with those adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance. XXVIII MEMO/11/227, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-227_en.htm. During the ‘European Debt Crisis’, the Ecofin and the Eurogroup regularly adopted joint declarations and press releases (e. g. Ecofin Communication 9614/10, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09614.en10.pdf). This communication technique is questionable vis-à-vis the principle of transparency (Article 1 of the TEU), as it joins one institution of the Union (Ecofin) and an informal political body (Eurogroup) that have members that do not coincide [the Ministers for Finance of all Member States (Ecofin) and the Ministers for Finance of Eurozone Member States (Eurogroup)] and are involved in different bailout mechanisms [EFSM (Ecofin) and the EFSF (Eurogoup)]. The Court of Justice recently declared that the Eurogroup is not among the different configurations of the Council and ‘cannot be equated with a configuration of the Council or be classified as a body, office or agency of the European Union within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU’ (Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:702, at 61). XXIX This decision was published in the OJ L 159/88 with the date of approval of 30 May, later corrected to 17 May in a corrigendum (see OJ L 178, p. 15). No legal consequences stem from this mistake because the Portuguese State is the sole addressee of the Decision (Article 5). According to Article 297 (2) (§3) TFEU the effects of decisions are produced upon notification of the addressee. XXX The swiftness in the signature of the MoU was due to the fact that the first disbursement of the financial assistance was linked to its entry into force [Article 1 (4) Decision 344/2011/EU]. The emergency of the moment probably explains why the Council Implementing Decision is not numbered in the preamble of the MoU. XXXI On 3 May 2011, a slightly modified version of the MoU was signed between the Portuguese Government and the right-wing opposition parties (PPD/PSD and CDS/PP) (English version available at http://aventadores.files.wordpresscom/2011/05/memorando_troika-en.pdf). The bailout request was made just after the resignation of the Portuguese (Socialist) Government following the Parliament´s refusal to adopt further austerity measures included in a fourth version of the Stability and Growth Pact presented to XXI Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E -127