tax structure while complying with a human rights framework’.288 Thus, a fiscal austerity plan should be based on an appropriate balance between cutting expenditures and increasing taxes. When public expenditure must be cut, the CESCR has developed strict criteria to assess austeritymeasure compliance in accordance with the ICESCR.289 In a letter sent to states on the matter,290 the CESCR chairperson acknowledged that decisions to ‘adopt austerity measures are always difficult and complex’, ‘especially when these austerity measures are taken in a recession’,291 but emphasised that: ‘Any proposed policy change or adjustment has to meet the following requirements: First, the policy must be a temporary measure covering only the period of crisis. Secondly, the policy must be necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social and cultural rights. Thirdly, the policy must not be discriminatory and must comprise all possible measures, including tax measures, to support social transfers to mitigate inequalities that can grow in times of crisis and to ensure that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected. Fourthly, the policy must identify the minimum core content of rights or a social protection floor, as developed by the International Labour Organization, and ensure the protection of this core content at all times.’292 Four years after the aforementioned letter, the CESCR issued a statement on ‘Public debt, austerity measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’. This statement was triggered by the fact that the CESCR frequently faced situations where States Parties to the ICESCR did not comply with their obligations owing to the adoption of fiscal consolidation programmes, ‘including structural adjustment programmes and austerity programmes as a condition for obtaining loans’.293 In its statement, the CESCR further developed the legal framework that was previously applied in concluding recommendations in order to provide guidance to States Parties and other actors regarding the scope of ICESCR obligations in relation to incurring debt. The statement clarified that borrowing states should: 288 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (on human rights-based approach to recovery) (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/34, para 80. 289 The analysis here focuses on the obligation to mobilise resources. Yet, treaty bodies and special procedures have addressed several aspects of the crisis. Eg, they have identified its causes, expressed concern over the most vulnerable groups, identified harmful policies that states have implemented as well as recommended policy measures that would be in line with a human rights-based approach. See, eg, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2011) A/HRC/17/34; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on housing, Raquel Rolnik’ (the financial crisis and its causes) (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/7. 290 Letter, dated 16 May 2012, to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 291 Letter, dated 16 May 2012, to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 292 Letter, dated 16 May 2012, to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 293 CESCR statement on public debt, austerity measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22 July 2016, UN Doc E/C.12/2016/1, para 1. December 2017   The Obligation to Mobilise Resources: Bridging Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, and Economic and Fiscal Policies 75