502us2$26D 01-22-99 08:32:58 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 502 U. S. 367 (1992) 381 Opinion of the Court changes in circumstances that were beyond the defendants’ control and were not contemplated by the court or the parties when the decree was entered. The experience of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation. See, e. g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, supra.6 The Courts of Appeals have also observed that the public interest is a particularly significant reason for applying a flexible modification standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees “reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public’s right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions.” Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F. 2d 1105, 1109 (CA6 1989). Accord, New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, supra, at 969. 6 In Carey, the state defendants sought modification of a consent decree designed to empty a state school for the mentally retarded that had housed over 6,000 people in squalid conditions. The consent judgment contemplated transfer of residents to community placements of 15 or fewer beds. 706 F. 2d, at 959. Defendants urged that revising the decree to allow placement of some residents in larger community residences would both expedite their transfer from the state school and allow for a higher quality of care. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, allowed the modification: “Here, as in Swift, the modification is proposed by the defendants. But it is not, as in Swift, in derogation of the primary objective of the decree, namely, to empty such a mammoth institution . . . ; indeed defendants offered substantial evidence that, again in contrast to Swift, the modification was essential to attaining that goal at any reasonably early date. To be sure, the change does run counter to another objective of the decree, namely, to place the occupants . . . in small facilities bearing some resemblance to a normal home, but any modification will perforce alter some aspect of the decree.” Id., at 969. In so ruling, the court recognized that “[t]he power of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.” Id., at 967.