502us2$26Z 01-22-99 08:32:58 PAGES OPINPGT
368
RUFO v. INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL
Syllabus
Held:
1. The Swift “grievous wrong” standard does not apply to requests
to modify consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation.
That standard was formulated in the context of facts demonstrating that
no genuine changes had occurred requiring modification of the decree in
question, see id., at 115–116, and the Swift Court recognized that decrees involving the supervision of changing conduct or conditions may
be revised if necessary to adapt to future events, id., at 114–115. Moreover, subsequent decisions have emphasized the need for flexibility to
modify a decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, have
changed or new ones have arisen. Thus, it cannot be concluded that
Rule 60(b)(5) misread Swift and intended that decree modifications were
in all cases to be governed by the “grievous wrong” standard. A less
stringent standard is made all the more important by the recent
upsurge in institutional reform litigation, where the extended life of
decrees increases the likelihood that significant changes will occur.
Furthermore, the experience of federal courts in implementing and
modifying such decrees demonstrates that a flexible approach is often
essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation, particularly the public’s interest in the sound and efficient operations of its institutions.
The contention that any rule other than the Swift standard would deter
parties to such litigation from negotiating settlements and hence destroy
the utility of consent decrees is unpersuasive. Obviously that would
not be the case with respect to government officials. Moreover, plaintiffs will still wish to settle such cases, since, even if they litigate to
conclusion and win, the resulting judgment may give them less than
they hoped for, whereas settlement will avoid further litigation, will
perhaps obtain more than would have been ordered without the local
government’s consent, and will eliminate the possibility of losing; and
since the prospective effect of a judgment obtained after litigation will
still be open to modification where deemed equitable under Rule 60(b).
Pp. 378–383.
2. Under the flexible standard adopted today, a party seeking modification of an institutional reform consent decree bears the burden of
establishing that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision
of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to
the changed circumstances. Pp. 383–393.
(a) Modification may be warranted when changed factual conditions
make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous, when the
decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles, or
when enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Where a party relies upon events that
actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree, modifica-