A/HRC/28/59/Add.1 24. The rebuilding of the banking sector and the protection of core social expenditure from cuts required borrowing by the Government. While in 2007, the central government debt was 43 per cent of GDP, it reached 109 per cent of GDP in 2013. The main reasons for the increase of public debt were the shifting of private debt — mainly by banks — into public debt and the depreciation of the krona, as 33 per cent of the central government debt was denominated in foreign currency.20 B. Sheltering the welfare state 25. The emergency legislation approved by Parliament in October 2008 and subsequent adjustment policies were based on the principle that socialization of the losses of the banking collapse should be avoided as much as possible. Savings in deposit accounts were secured for Icelandic customers and given preference over other claims, including those by international institutional investors. The debt of many local businesses was written off to a large degree to ensure that economically viable businesses and related workplaces would survive. The devaluation of the Icelandic krona helped export-driven demand, in particular in the fishing industry, and contributed to a tourism boom. However, workers, in particular those in the construction industry, suffered a heavy blow. 26. The Government must be commended for sheltering core social expenditure against cuts. While overall government revenues fell as a consequence of the economic crisis, the State made a strategic decision to maintain the percentage of the budget for health care and education, and even increased social protection expenditure from about 8.5 per cent of GDP in 2008 to above 10 per cent of GDP during the first four years after the banking collapse (see figure 1). Figure 1 General government expenditure on social protection, health and education (in percentage of GDP) Source: Statistics Iceland, General government finances 2013, 23 September 2014. 20 10 Central Bank of Iceland, Economy of Iceland (Reykjavik, September 2014), p. 70.