A/HRC/27/55 progressive realization, the Court applied a standard of “reasonableness”.38 It held that a reasonable programme must: be comprehensive, coherent and coordinated; be capable of facilitating the realization of the right; prioritize the needs of those in the most desperate situations; make appropriate financial and human resources available; be balanced and flexible; make appropriate provision for short-, medium- and long-term needs; be reasonably conceived and implemented; and be transparent.39 Through that approach, the Court clarified that, while it is the role of the Government to determine precise policies and programmes, it is the proper role of courts to assess whether policies and programmes are in compliance with human rights. In Grootboom, the Court found that the State’s programmes failed to address as a priority the circumstances of those in the most desperate situations, and required the Government to take measures to correct this.40 40. The Optional Protocol incorporates the standard of reasonableness in article 8(4), which stipulates that States may choose the precise means to realize Covenant rights from a range of options, but stresses that it is the role of the Committee to assess whether those measures are reasonable. In the light of limited national jurisprudence addressing States’ failures to progressively realize the rights to water and sanitation, the Special Rapporteur urges States to ensure that courts have the authority to adjudicate such cases and that judges and prosecutors are adequately trained to make such assessments. 2. Failure to properly raise, allocate and utilize available resources or to budget appropriately 41. A leading cause of systemic violations of the rights to water and sanitation relates to the failure of States to raise, allocate and utilize necessary resources.41 Violations can be grouped into the following types: (a) failure to raise the maximum available resources through taxation and other sources of revenue; (b) failure to combat tax evasion and illicit financial flows; (c) failure to seek and accept international assistance where needed; (d) failure to allocate appropriate levels of funding; (f) failure to fully utilize allocated resources; (e) failure to direct resources to meeting the needs of vulnerable or marginalized communities; and (g) failure to direct sufficient funds to sub-national governments and other delegated authorities to allow them to fulfil their roles. 42. Current water and sanitation budgets may not reflect maximum available resources, as they may have been developed on the basis of budget decisions or fiscal policy that failed to prioritize the rights to water and sanitation. Existing budgets must therefore not be equated with available resources. In the Blue Moonlight case, the South African Constitutional Court demonstrated the role that courts can play in determining whether budgets comply with human rights obligations using the standard of reasonableness, holding that “it is not good enough for the City to state that it has not budgeted for something, if it should indeed have planned and budgeted for it in the fulfilment of its obligations”.42 43. Civil society organizations have also made important advances in assessing whether maximum available resources are being raised and utilized, providing evidence on which to 38 39 40 41 42 12 Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., at paras. 39 and 40; Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, 5 July 2002, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC), para. 123. Constitutional Court, South Africa, Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), para. 96. Radhika Balakrishnan et al., Maximum Available Resources & Human Rights (Rutgers, 2011). Constitutional Court of South Africa, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties et al., Case CCT 37/11, [2011] ZACC 33.