2008] The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights 137 Yet as Frank Michelman emphasizes, the redistributions (and lack of redistributions) which impact dignity in post-apartheid South Africa, or even in Canada, may be very diffe rent from what is consid ered “reasonable” in the 133 To the more laissez-faire constitutiona l culture of the United States. constitutionalist mindset, the ambiti ons for universality in setting an objectively defined minimum core based on di gnity are, i n reality, very difficult to satisfy. The “relative” scale of the dignitarian experience, matching different levels of comm odities, is explained well by Amartya Sen’s overt recognition of how the base line of goods required for “appearing in public without shame” will be variable between different societies. 134 The content of economic and social righ ts—and thus the minimu m core—will be similarly inconsistent, not only because of varied resources, but als o because of the different cultural expectations that may run parallel to this influence. This “reasonable” (or “r elational”) assessment brings an important subtlety to the process of articulating the content of economic and soci al rights.135 Yet what it also does is challenge the idea of a fixed, predetermined, and non-negotiable baseline. Other a ttempts at providing the contours and boundaries of the norms of distributiv e justice similarly demur at deli vering abstractions and reference-ready lists. If we consider the normative project of articulating the necessary baselines of “human capa bility” across differently situated societies and gr oups, we find a deliberate refusal to se ttle on a awing up such a list, even minimum. 136 Indeed, the question of dr provisionally, divides the positions of Amartya Se n and Martha Nussbaum— two central advocates of the capabilitie s approach—and maps well onto the arguments against the minimum core. Martha Nussbaum’s universalist project “isolates those human capab ilities that can be convin cingly argued to be of central importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or chooses,” 137 as the appropriate underpin ning of basic constitutional principles. 138 Other feminists have criticized the attempt as insufficiently (2003) (arguing for the f ormal criminalization—as crimes against humanity—of intentional or reckless government policies which result in mass starvation). 133. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage , supra note 128, at 1418; Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitu tion: Culture, Courts, and Law , 117 H ARV. L. REV. 4, 76 (2003) (examining how constitutional law “draws inspir ation, strength, and legitim acy from constitutional culture, which endows constitutional law with orientation and purpose”). 134. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 115 (1992) (“In a country that is generally rich, more income may be needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social functioning.”). Sen traces this conception to Adam Smith’s idea of “necessary goods.” Id. (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 351-52 (Clarendon Press 1975) (1776)). 135. See Liebenberg, Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights, supra note 121, at 23. 136. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 134, at 108-09 (pointing out the problem of social variation in describing pov erty, but noting the potential for intercultural and inte rpersonal agreement on capabilities). 137. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 74 (2000). Nussbaum’s current ten-point version se ts out the importance of life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the senses, imagination and thought, the developm ent of emotions, practical r eason, forms of social affiliation, concern for other specie s, opportunity for play, and the political and material con trol over one’s environment. Id. at 77-80. We can contrast this with the inventory of eight va lues devised by the New Haven School: power, enlightenm ent, wealth, well-being, skill, affecti on, respect, and rectitude. See Wiessner & Willard, supra note 115, at 318. 138. Wiessner & Willard, supra note 115, at 5 (drawing parallels with J OHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996)).