150 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33: 113 standing objects of empir ical study. 210 In the same way, it applies to the burgeoning and l ess studied field of i nternational lawmaking, including the work of international organizations, supranational tribunals, and the more informal transnational conferences and expertise-sharing, which constitute the global consensus.211 Indeed, the influence of economists’ theories of liberalization and deregulation, ubiquitous in t he restructuring and structural adjustment environment of the 1990s, are mo re visible and yet less legitimate instantiations of consensus in the in ternational environment. During this period, the economic strategies of the “Washington Consensus” converged on the desirability of growth strategies which would remove economic and social entitlements and thus harm the po or—at least in the short term. 212 The neoliberal blueprints were infl uential in informing the regime change in the transitioning post-communist states, as well as t he structural reforms and poverty reduction strategies in development projects, which were prerequisites for the award of loans or debt relief. 213 The “consensus” on structural reforms is empirically apt, even if it hides the real motivations behind the adoption of such policies. It is perhaps no coincidence that th e overtly state-oriented commentary of the Committee drifted away fr om state practice during the 1990s, 214 or at least looked for broader instantiations of consen sus than those offered by evidence of states’ convergence on neoliberal economic policies. Counterexamples from state practice were available—sometimes expressed by courts defending their constitutional regi mes against the reforms promoted by the executive at the instig ation of the internationa l financial institutions. 215 And the “chastening” of these idea s in light of empirical evidence 216 suggests that the driving ideas of th is period were not in fact expressions of consensus, 210. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (applying m odels from public choice to illuminate decision m aking in political institutions); Jerry Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law , 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 123 (1989). For a less cynical portrayal from the legal process school, see H ENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958). 211. For an application of legal process to the international le gal system, see, for example, ABRAM CHAYES ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Revie w Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? , 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2619 (1997) (pointing out the successors of legal process and yet urging a more thorough account of transnational legal process). 212. STIGLITZ, supra note 48, at 11-16, 73-74, 134-42 (offering a practitio ner’s critique of “market fundamentalism”); Forsythe & Heinze, supra note 203, at 63 (linking the dem ands of the Washington Consensus to the weakening of economic and social rights). 213. E.g., PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004) (investigating conditionality and its effect on hum an rights); Frances Stewart & Michael Wang, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Within the Human Rights Perspe ctive, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT, supra note 97, at 447, 462-70 (noting important discrepancies between co nditional poverty reduction strategies and human rights agendas). 214. See infra Part IV. 215. E.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social R ights, 82 T EX. L. REV. 1921 (2004) (describing Hungary’s rejecti on of market reforms via a judicial defense of economic and social rights). 216. For a conception of chastened neoliberalism , see T HE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).