the State Reporting Guidelines for detailing those emergency situations which have been declared and the measures taken as a result of them.103 Given the difficulties with necessity and proportionality analyses and the vagaries of the ‘temporary’ provision, ex post review of ‘emergency’ measures should particularly address the minimum core and non-discrimination requirements. VI. CONCLUSIONS The CESCR’s Letter to States was a brief, but highly significant intervention. It can be given various characterisations, as soft law, rhetorically weighty, or as no more than a note to fill the vacuum of comment on the crises by the Committee. It has been suggested here that the extent of the Letter’s influence is of deep importance due to its substantive content. The Letter introduces a number of significant changes to the operation and conceptual framework of the ICESCR. These changes take the doctrine of retrogression in a new, and somewhat counterproductive, direction and if they remain in place a number of significant flaws need to be addressed. While there are significant ongoing debates concerning emergency theories, it was the Business as Usual approach that was built into the ICESCR. This has now been set aside in favour of a framework of accommodations. There now seems to be significant latitude given to States by the CESCR in times of economic crisis, and the level of States’ obligations during such crises appears to have been reduced. The similarity of those minimal tests to the derogations clauses found in other treaties is concerning. It moves the ICESCR towards incorporating the same flexible approaches which are found in the ICCPR, while neglecting to acknowledge the significant degree of flexibility which is already to be found in the ICESCR. The tests employed by the CESCR in its Letter to determine whether crisis policies are permissible are also a cause of concern. It seems that the Committee aims to test whether a policy was necessary and proportionate in the light of the crises. This raises broader questions about how to examine the incommensurate values of rights and economics, and introduces a worrying prospect of rights protections being ‘bought-out’. The requirement that violative measures only be ‘temporary’ also remains problematic, as there is no discussion of the implications of a ‘temporary’ violation provided by the CESCR. A number of general issues also arise from the changes. The newly acquired ability of States to largely suspend their obligations under the Covenant does not sit easily alongside a regime of progressive realisation that already provides significant flexibility to States Parties. There is an additional concern that orientating the ICESCR towards economic emergencies, while the ICCPR focuses primarily on security emergencies could re-entrench stereotypes about the two ‘sets’ of rights. A final concern was the weakness of the existing system for safeguarding rights against abuses during times of emergency. Despite affording States significant additional flexibility, the Committee has not given greater attention to monitoring their actions. Thus there is little clarity about how States can take advantage of this additional leeway in times of crisis, whether there are procedural hurdles that are to be fulfilled, or how the emergency situation CESCR, ‘Guidelines On Treaty-Specific Documents To Be Submitted By States Parties Under Articles 16 And 17 Of The International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2. 103 14