Although developed in relation to security emergencies, the accommodation model has been applied to economic emergencies in the literature22 and hallmarks of the model have been seen in practical responses to economic crises.23 Recently, however, it has been argued that the distinctive features of economic emergencies undermine the normative justifications for traditional accommodation responses.24 According to this argument, the design or use of legal frameworks to allow emergency accommodations in response to economic crises is largely unjustified.25 Proponents of the Business as Usual approach, on the other hand, argue that denying emergency accommodations acts as a ‘strategy of resistance’ 26 which can minimize the frequency and severity of government ‘crisis’ responses.27 The Business as Usual approach has also been described as ‘socially beneficial’ as it demands justifications and explanations by reference to a ‘normal’ standard.28 Such a requirement for justification might translate into the maintenance of a more consistent set of legal principles or rights. III. PRE-2012 APPROACH Taken as a whole, the ICESCR has not traditionally supported deviations from Covenant obligations that are rationalised as ‘emergency’ responses 29 and it contains no provision allowing for derogations.30 Instead, flexibilities are afforded through article 2(1)31 and article 4, and additionally through the use of less prescriptive substantive articles. The most significant of these – article 4 – allows States to enact ‘limitations’ but, crucially, does not frame such measures as ‘emergency’ ones. The distinction between derogations and limitations is not an exact one, but there are several differences of ‘character and scope’.32 For example, derogation provisions are subject to a threshold condition, meaning there must usually be a ‘time of public emergency’ before the reduction of rights protections can be contemplated.33 This is not the case with limitations, which can be enacted at any time including in situations of ‘normality’. There are additional differences in the scope of the potential interference(s) with rights. With derogations regimes, the restraining factors on action tend to be the ‘exigencies of the situation’, ‘other obligations under international law’ and the requirement of non-discrimination. 34 In the context of limitations, however, requirements of legality, compatibility with the ‘nature’ of the rights 22 Scheuerman (n 9) 1873. 23 Alan Greene, ‘Questioning Executive Supremacy in an Economic State of Emergency’ [2015] Legal Studies 10–16. 24 ibid especially pp 16–26. 25 ibid 27. 26 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 7) 99. 27 ibid 99–101. 28 Frederick Schauer, ‘Easy Cases’ (1985) 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 439; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 7) 101. Diane A Desierto, ‘ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non-Expropriation Compensation Model during Financial Crises’ (2012) 44 George Washington International Law Review 473, 493. 29 30 M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) 281 (fn 132), 293. Indeed there was no specific discussion of such a provision during the drafting process; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 217. Scott Leckie, ‘Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81, 94. 31 32 Amrei Müller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 557, 654. 33 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171) article 4. 34 4 ibid article 4.