A/70/275 (c) The future multilateral framework on debt restructuring should adequately address negative human rights impacts caused by hold -outs; (d) Debt restructuring should ensure that minimum essential levels for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights can be satisfied even in contexts of financial crisis; and that retrogressive measures affecting the enjoyment of these rights should be avoided; (e) The human rights principles of impartiality, transparency, participation and accountability should be reflected in a new legal framework for debt restructuring; (f) International and regional human rights protection mechanisms, national human rights institutions and civil society organizations should be play a role in the decision-making processes with regard to debt restructurings. III. Reconciling debt obligations with human rights through pacta sunt servanda 33. With the aim of contributing to the current debate in the General Assembly on the legal framework for debt restructuring, the Independent Expert presents below some reflections on the scope of a principle of international law — pacta sunt servanda — the principle that agreements must be kept — in the context of foreign debt obligations and in the light of international law, including international human rights law. 34. These considerations might be particularly relevant to interpreting the concrete content of two specific principles, legitimacy and sustainability, identified by the Ad Hoc committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes at its 3rd meeting, held in New York on 27 July 2015. 18 A. The principle of pacta sunt servanda in context 35. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is often taken to be a general and absolute rule of law, including of international law. It is understood as one of the legal and theoretical underpinnings that oblige countries to adhere to debt payment schedules no matter the circumstance. Pacta sunt servanda may be commonly accepted as a foundation in commercial transactions, leading to a generalized assumption that sovereign debt should be treated as any other private obligations. However, in the view of the Independent Expert, there are several differences. 36. Any presentation of this rule in an absolutist manner (denying the option to discuss possible exceptions to the repayment obligation), without an understanding of the underlying sovereign context, is often an oversimplification and therefore incomplete. In the opinion of the Independent Expert, this discussion is not purely theoretical but has broad financial implications, as the scope and strength of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the realm of sovereign debt can define, to a great extent, who bears the financial losses in debt restructurings. __________________ 18 10/18 See A/AC.284/2015/L.1. 15-12541