32 BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND JUDGMENT and the declarations of certain Community institutions. Moreover, the applicant company had had the opportunity, unlike in Matthews, fully to ventilate its claim that its fundamental rights had been breached and the decision of the ECJ had been based on a consideration of its property rights. As to the United Nations, the Government pointed to Articles 1 § 3 and 55 of the United Nations Charter, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. 2. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 112. The Government's primary argument was that Ireland's compliance with its international obligations constituted in itself sufficient justification for any interference with the applicant company's property rights. 113. In the alternative, the impounding of the aircraft amounted to a lawful and proportionate control of use of the applicant company's possessions in the public interest (see AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, pp. 17-18, § 51, and Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 5 May 1995, Series A no. 316A, p. 16, § 34). The margin of appreciation was broad, given the strength of the two public-interest objectives pursued: the principles of public international law, including pacta sunt servanda, pursuant to which the State discharged clear mandatory international obligations following the decisions of the relevant United Nations and European Community bodies (the Sanctions Committee and the ECJ), and participation in an international effort to end a conflict. 114. The Government relied on their submissions in the context of Article 1 of the Convention in order to argue that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not require compensation or account to have been taken of the relaxation of the sanctions regime in October 1994. They also made detailed submissions challenging the applicant company's bona fides, although they maintained that its innocence would not have rendered the impoundment inconsistent with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Finally, they replied to the applicant company's detailed allegations concerning the position of TEAM and, in particular, explained that proceedings had not been issued against TEAM because that would have amounted to applying retrospectively the criminal liability for which Statutory Instrument no. 144 of 1993 had provided.