A/HRC/13/33/Add.4 fincas distributed between 1998 and 2008, only 12 were distributed between 2006 and 2008, with unprocessed and outstanding applications apparently totalling over 900 files.48 57. These figures corroborate information received by the Special Rapporteur during the visit that FONTIERRAS has been underfunded and has not worked effectively. Investment in the programme had gone down from GTQ 126.5 million in 2004 to GTQ 22 million in 2006.49 The low number of fincas distributed indicates that landowners have generally been reluctant to sell their land under the market-based mechanism operated by FONTIERRAS, while families eligible for FONTIERRAS credit faced high prices as a result of an overestimation of the value of the fincas. As a result, the majority of families who were given credit to buy a finca are now highly indebted, while no technical assistance was provided to enable them to work the land. In certain cases, the land distributed was not even suitable for cultivation. 58. The Special Rapporteur was informed that discussions on the future status and resources of FONTIERRAS are currently under way, as the 10-year period originally foreseen for land purchases comes to an end in 2009. This is an opportunity to address the shortcomings identified above and to ensure that the backlog of cases that has built up is reduced, whilst making provisions for increased support to the beneficiaries of the programme in terms of technical assistance and investment in infrastructure and social services. The need for this is clear given that out of the total number of fincas distributed by 2006, 72 per cent had no health-care facilities, 61 per cent had no school, 67 per cent had inadequate housing, 68 per cent had no drinking water and 71 per cent were without electricity.50 59. The limited results of FONTIERRAS are also linked to the creation of a separate programme on land leasing (Programa de Arrendamiento), which was set up in 2004 and has gradually received increased funding, going up from GTQ 32.5 million in 2004 to GTQ 52 million in 2006. By 2008, the programme had approved more than 82,000 leases covering approximately 60,000 hectares of land.51 However, this programme has provided largely short-term leasing arrangements for land without an option to buy. It is not a substitute for the Programme on Access to Land as it does not lead to secure land tenure. 60. The creation of a fully functional land registry is another pertinent part of agrarian reform in Guatemala. In this respect, the Special Rapporteur wishes to express his concern at a provision of the 2005 Land Registry law, which provides that landowners can claim up to 20 per cent of land, relative to the size of their own holding, in addition to the area which their property documents state they are entitled to.52 This provision, which contains the promise of unending future conflicts and increased land concentration, should be abolished immediately. E. Recourse mechanisms 61. In terms of recourse mechanisms, and more broadly accountability for the right to food, the Special Rapporteur notes in particular the active role of the Ombudsman. Article 15 (j) of the SINASAN law stipulates that CONASAN must “know, analyse and propose amendments to the policies and strategies in the area of food and nutritional security on the basis of the recommendations issued by the Ombudsman annually on the respect for and the 48 49 50 51 52 16 Ibid., p. 42-43. Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 45. Decreto número 41-2005, Ley del Registro de Información Catastral, articles 38 and 67.