of powers principles. There is much at stake in courts involving themselves in a highly charged balancing exercise, involving the complex weighting of principles of distributive justice, while maintaining a pragmatic grasp on their own legitimacy. Yet this dynamic does question the justification for proportionality analysis based on its purported disciplining effect. This is because if nothing within proportionality analysis dictates whether the court inquires more or less searchingly to the questions it asks at each stage, or how it should provide a margin of appreciation, then its claims to discipline and coherence are weakened.115 The approach is then, in this respect, on par with the less explicit deference applied in reasonableness review.116 C. The Structure of Limitations Finally, the approaches to proportionality and reasonableness differ in their structuring of the limitation inquiry. As described above, proportionality analysis offers a disciplined, regimented, structured inquiry into the aims, necessity, (sometimes suitability) and proportionality of a limitation of a right. In this respect, it calls for the least (or sometimes merely less117) restrictive alternative. Even if these tests are not strictly observed in South Africa, the sequence represents a higher order of justification. Reasonableness, on the 115 While a full engagement with these arguments is beyond the scope of this chapter, one does not need to adopt the wholesale legal realism of Mark Tushnet, Easy Cases Make Hard Law, in this volume, to question the guarantee of certainty in the proposal of Klatt & Schmidt, supra note 111. 116 For the suggestion that South African judges are averse to deference, due to the apartheid legacy, see Hugh Corder, From Despair to Deference: Same Difference?, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DAVID MULLAN (Huscroft & Taggart eds., 2006) 327, 328. 117 Sth. Afr. § 36 (1)(e) (a reasonable and justifiable limitation is measured against a number of factors, including the availability of any “less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”.) 28