other hand, provides a holistic, general question, incorporating notions of necessity, suitability and proportionality in an ad hoc method, which is arguably less restraining of the adjudicator’s own views. Again, the example of Mazibuko demonstrates the destructuring of the proportionality step within reasonableness review: in finding Johannesburg’s water reforms to be reasonable, the court did not consider whether the City’s objectives – “to reduce unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate the water network, to reduce water demand and to improve the rate of payment”118 could have been pursued through other, less restrictive alternatives. For example, the Constitutional Court did not consider whether the City’s objectives might have been achieved through installation of conventional credit meters (which would not result in automatic shutoffs); or whether a more generous quota applied overall would be more cost-effective than keeping an indigent person’s register, given that the City’s representative had indicated that the universalist system would be cheaper to administer.119 In this respect, the structure of proportionality analysis might force the adjudicator to engage more explicitly with the more rights-respecting alternatives. So too may a more explicit adoption of the proportionality principle, without the requirement of deference. IV. PROPORTIONALITY-INFLECTED REASONABLENESS? 118 Mazibuko 2010 (3) BCLR 239 at para. 13. See, e.g., Anashri Pillay & Murray Wesson, Recession, Recovery and Service Delivery: Political and Judicial Responses to the Financial and Economic Crisis in South Africa, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 101, at 352. 119 29