A second reason for concern is that the model is incomplete, in that it does not allow to distinguish
between the different reasons why a country scores poorly on the proposed measure of economic
and social rights fulfilment ‐‐ either because of a relatively poor ratio between its achievements on
certain outcome indicators and the resources it could mobilize to improve such indicators further, or
compared to what, historically, countries at a similar level of development could achieve. But this
would seem to matter. For instance, even with an identical GDP per capita, the ability of countries to
perform well on socio‐economic indicators related to health or child malnutrition (as measured by
stunting rates) may differ widely in the presence of epidemics or where climatic conditions affect the
quality of harvests; access to water and sanitation may be more difficult to achieve in countries with
a population dispersed over a large territory, than in countries where the population is concentrated
in certain areas; and certain social or cultural norms, such as those that reduce the mobility of
women or their decision‐making power within the household ‐‐ though women's empowerment can
significantly affect the educational, nutritional and health outcomes for children (Smith and Haddad
2000; Pitt et al. 2003) ‐‐, may be difficult to transform in the short run.
In assessing whether a country is setting its priorities adequately, such constraints cannot be ignored.
Indeed, that is what makes the use of indicators in development studies different from their use to
promote human rights accountability: while there are many reasons why socio‐economic indicators
are poor in certain countries ‐‐ including natural calamities, lack of resources, or constraints imposed
by the international environment ‐‐, the finding that human rights violations have occurred,
potentially leading to a finding of responsibility, presupposes that the State is in a position to
improve such outcomes, in other terms, that the deprivations are the result of a lack of political will.
As noted by the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: "In
determining which actions or omissions amount to a violation of an economic, social or cultural right,
it is important to distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of a State to comply with its treaty
obligations" (para. 13).
In some respects therefore, the approach by Fukuda‐Parr and her colleagues underestimates the
ability of a country to transform the conditions it is confronted with; in other respects, such an ability
seems to be overestimated, and the real constraints it faces ignored. To overcome these limitations
of the model proposed, two directions may be explored. One is diagnostic monitoring: the
identification, by a causal analysis, of the reasons why certain outcomes are unsatisfactory, and of
the measures that could be adopted to remove such obstacles. Another is to take into account the
time dimension: the fact that the achievement of economic and social rights may require a sustained
multi‐year effort, across a range of sectors, in order to overcome the constraints identified.
d) Causality analysis and diagnostic monitoring
The first direction is explored by Eitan Felner in Chapter 11 of this volume (see also Felner 2009).
Felner proposes to use quantitative data, combined with qualitative information, in order to move
from outcomes (economic and social rights deprivations and disparities of outcome) (step # 1 of the
three‐steps approach), to the identification of the "main determinants of these outcomes so as to
identify the policy responses that can reasonably be expected of the state" (step # 2), and finally (in
step # 3) to the assessment of the extent to which "deprivations, disparities and lack of progress can
be traced back to failures of government policy" (Chapter 11: 116). Only by identifying why a State
scores poorly on certain socio‐economic indicators, can certain questions be asked about State
conduct: for instance, in a State with a low schooling rate for girls, whether that outcome is
attributable to social or cultural norms or, instead, to the lack of economic incentives (for instance,
due to discrimination against women in employment, which is a disincentive to invest in girls'
education), leads to different expectations as to what the response of the State should be (Chapter
11: 126). Such a causality analysis should make it possible to identify which deprivations of social and
economic rights (as measured by outcome indicators) are attributable to a failure of the State to
24
CRIDHO‐WP‐2013/2: O. De Schutter – Economic,Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights: An Introduction
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents