the enactment of appropriate legislation which would be in compliance with the aforementioned constitutional provisions; that a mandamus be issued, directing the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to place before the General Assembly appropriate legislation which is constitutionally valid; and that a mandamus be issued, directing the General Assembly to provide for an "equitable and adequate funding program for all school children so as to establish an 'efficient system of common schools.' " The answers filed by the various defendants were basically identical. It was pled that the complaint failed to state a claim against any of the defendants; that the court had no jurisdiction because the subject matter is purely a "political" one; that all school boards should have been joined as parties defendants; that all members of the General Assembly (1986) should also have been joined as parties defendant; that all the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action; that, specifically, the plaintiff Council for Better Education, Inc., had no legal authority to sue; that the plaintiff school boards similarly had no legal authority to sue; that the class action was improper; and as would be expected, the defendants denied all of the alleged constitutional violations and the facts underlying such alleged violations. The defendants also filed a self-styled "affirmative defense" claiming that education reform laws passed by the General Assembly at a special session in 1985 and various budget changes and other educational laws passed by the General Assembly at its 1986 regular session inferentially corrected the situation alleged in the complaint. Reference was also made to past legislative efforts of the General Assembly in the education field, presumably to further demonstrate the General Assembly's compliance with its constitutional mandate. In the trial court, the defendants moved for a summary judgment, based primarily on the claim that no relief could be granted against the General Assembly because of lack of service on all 138 members thereof and that the parties lacked standing or legal capacity to sue. The trial court overruled this motion in its entirety. The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. Evidence was presented by deposition, along with oral testimony and much documentary evidence. The trial court entered the first of several orders, findings of fact and judgments on May 31, 1988. [FN2] Generally, that order found Kentucky's common school finance system to be unconstitutional and discriminatory and held that the General Assembly had not produced an efficient system of common schools throughout the state. On October 14, 1988 a final, appealable judgment was entered. [FN2. An analysis of these documents follows.] A notice of appeal was timely filed by the present appellants, John A. Rose, President Pro Tempore of the Senate of Kentucky and Donald J. Blandford, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Kentucky. Upon a motion properly made, we transferred the appeal to this Court. II. ANALYSIS OF TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT Following the trial of this case, the circuit judge, in three separate documents, prepared extensive findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment(s). Because of the length of these documents, we feel it important to analyze them in some detail. DOCUMENT NUMBER I Following the bench trial, and upon proper submission, the judge on May 31, 1988 entered a document that is styled, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment."