The trial judge identified four issues before him: (1) The necessity for defining the phrase "an efficient system of common schools" as contained in Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution; (2) Whether education is a "fundamental right" under our Constitution; (3) Whether Kentucky's current method of financing its common schools violates Section 183, and (4) Whether students in the so-called "poor" school districts are denied equal protection of the laws. "Efficient," in the Kentucky constitutional sense was defined as a system which required "substantial uniformity, substantial equality of financial resources and substantial equal educational opportunity for all students." Efficient was also interpreted to require that the educational system must be adequate, uniform and unitary. Because of the language of Section 183, the trial court ruled that education, indeed, is a fundamental right in Kentucky. In ruling on the issue of whether Kentucky's method of school financing violates Section 183 and underpinning the point with extensive findings of fact, the trial court declared that students in property poor school districts are offered a minimal level of educational opportunities, which is inferior to those offered to students in more affluent districts. Such "invidious" discrimination, based on the place of a student's residence, was determined to be unconstitutional. The trial court ruled that the school finance system violates the equal protection guarantees of Section 1 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. In its judgment, the trial court ruled: (1) The Kentucky finance "system" of its common schools is unconstitutional and discriminatory; and (2) The system of common schools is not efficient within the purview of Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court indicated it would appoint a "small select committee," the purpose of which was to review all relevant data, provide additional analysis, consult with financial experts and propose remedies to "correct the deficiencies in the present common school financing system." The Court clearly stated that the Committee's plan, "when adopted by this Court," would not "intrude" on the prerogatives of the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Indeed, the report would only be an aid to serve as a guide in establishing "the parameters of the Constitutional requirements of Sections 1, 3 and 183." In this open ended document, the Court ruled the school finance system unconstitutional, but gave few guidelines, or criteria, to guide the General Assembly in any action it might take to rectify the constitutional failure. The work of the Committee, if adopted by the Court, was to serve as a guidepost in this murky area. DOCUMENT NUMBER II On June 7, 1988, the trial court, in this document, appointed the members of the "select committee." Apparently fearing he would improperly delegate some of his judicial authority by the creation of this committee, the trial judge emphasized that its role would be "advisory only" to him. But he noted that the report would be of "immense benefit" to him in preparing his final judgment. The Committee was ordered to complete its work by September 15, 1988. Modifying or explaining part of document # I, the court emphatically stated that there is "no judicial intent to merely re-divide the funds now available to the common school districts." Moreover, he emphasized that funds should not be taken away (presumably by the General Assembly) from any school district to increase the funding level of more impoverished districts. It is a fair inference from this statement that the trial court was strongly suggesting that additional revenues were needed to make the system "efficient." The defendant State Board of Education was ordered to pay, out of its funds, all expenses of the Committee. DOCUMENT NUMBER III